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Police departments have broad policymaking discretion to arrest 
some offenders and permit others to engage in criminal misconduct.  
The way police departments exercise this discretion has harmful 
distributive consequences.  Yet, courts do virtually nothing to constrain 
departmental discretion.  This is because constitutional criminal 
procedure is preoccupied with individual officer discretion and assumes 
that the most significant decision moment an officer faces is 
distinguishing guilt from innocence.  I argue that this framing obscures 
the vast policymaking discretion police departments wield and the 
central choice they confront: distinguishing among the guilty.  This 
Article identifies the mechanics and anti-egalitarian consequences of 
departmental discretion.  Departmental discretion has three dimensions: 
geographic deployment, enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics.  
Through these policy choices, police departments are able to distribute 
the costs and benefits of proactive policing within jurisdictions.  Case 
studies of narcotics enforcement and quality-of-life policing concretely 
demonstrate how departmental choices create inegalitarian distributive 
consequences.  I argue that courts and other public institutions ought to 
prevent such consequences.  This prescription requires conceptualizing 
arrests, and proactive policing more generally, in terms of distributive 
justice.  Unlike dominant theories of criminal enforcement, distributive 
justice offers a normative vision that privileges democratic equality.  
Distributive justice suggests that, for crimes that are subject to 
proactive policing, probable cause alone should not justify arrest.  
Rather, police departments should also be required to demonstrate that 
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a given arrest is part of an egalitarian distribution of arrests. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts imagine police discretion in terms of the decisionmaking 
latitude that individual officers enjoy.
1
  Officers make choices about whom 
to stop, search, and arrest.  Constitutional criminal procedure attempts to 
regulate how officers make those choices by prescribing the quantum of 
information they must possess regarding a suspect’s likely guilt before they 
may intrude upon her privacy or liberty.
2
  In other words, the judicial 
approach to police discretion assumes that individual officers are the 
principal discretion-wielding actors in policing and that the central problem 
they confront is distinguishing the guilty from the innocent.  From this 




This Article critiques the narrowly individualistic conception of police 
discretion that predominates in law, scholarship, and public discourse.
4
  
Casting the individual officer as the central discretion-wielding agent in 
policing obfuscates the arrest’s role as a policymaking device with broad 
distributive consequences.  If law is to ensure an egalitarian arrest 
distribution it should treat police departments, not officers, as the primary 
discretion-wielding actors.  Modern police departments exert high degrees 
of control over individual officers and rely heavily on arrest as an 
enforcement strategy.  The central problem confronting police departments 
is not distinguishing the guilty from the innocent, but rather distinguishing 
among the guilty.  Police departments—i.e., administrators and 
policymakers—regularly choose to target some offenders and to let others 
engage in comparable criminal activity without consequence.  This is most 
true in the “proactive policing” context, where the police themselves (as 
opposed to a victim or some other witness) identify criminal misconduct.  
Because criminal procedure is hushed about departmental discretion and 
because retributive, expressivist, and utilitarian theories dominate scholarly 
discussion of the criminal sanction, departmental discretion is under-
 
1 See infra notes 11–29 and accompanying text. 
2 See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
3 The Supreme Court has held exactly that.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996). 
4 Popular culture is preoccupied with police behavior at the individual officer level: high-
speed chases, excessive use of force, and the like are staples for the evening news.  And 
many people experience “the police” in terms of an individual encounter with an officer; 
typically, that encounter is in the traffic context.  See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 
2005, at 1 (Apr. 2007) (finding that more than half of all civilian-police contacts occur in the 
traffic context). 
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theorized in legal scholarship.  This Article describes departmental 
discretion’s mechanics and anti-egalitarian consequences.  It then sketches a 
normative vision for regulating departmental discretion relying on 
distributive justice theory. 
I argue that three dimensions of departmental discretion bear on how 
proactive policing arrests are distributed across a jurisdiction: geographic 
deployment, enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics.  How different 
groups bear the costs and benefits of arrests within a jurisdiction raises 
serious questions of democratic fairness.  For example, narcotics 
enforcement has swelled America’s prison populations with poor men of 
color.
5
  The pool of prospective narcotics offenders in a given city will 
typically be larger than could ever be arrested with complete enforcement.  
Offenders’ demographic profile will depend on where in a city police 
target—e.g., the race and class profile of narcotics offenders at an elite, 
liberal arts college on the urban periphery might be different from that of 
narcotics offenders in working class neighborhoods closer to the urban core.
  
Departmental choices about geographic deployment, enforcement priority, 
and enforcement tactics determine whether and how these areas are 
targeted.
6
  I argue that police departments tend to make such choices in a 
manner that generates unjustified inequality. 
Normatively, I argue that courts and scholars should conceptualize 
arrests, and proactive policing more generally, as a distributive good.  
Criminal enforcement’s moral legitimacy is typically grounded in 
retributive, expressivist, or utilitarian theories.  These theories offer little 
guidance on how to accommodate egalitarianism in proactive policing.  On 
the other hand, distributive justice’s central preoccupation is with how 
political institutions in a liberal democracy should achieve an egalitarian 
distribution of the benefits and burdens that collective political existence 
generates.
7
  Distributive justice animates discussions in various policy 
contexts and I argue that the same should be true for police department 
discretion.  That discretion is most pronounced in the proactive policing 
context where there are few legal or political checks on departmental 
discretion.  Distributive justice suggests that the mere fact of a criminal law 
 
5 See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 
67, 104, 112–13 (1995); infra Part III.B.1 (discussing a case study focusing on narcotics 
enforcement in Seattle). 
6 Individual officer bias would have no bearing on the arrestees’ demographic profile.  
See JOHN C. LAMBERTH, LAMBERTH CONSULTING, DATA COLLECTION AND BENCHMARKING 
OF THE BIAS POLICING PROJECT: FINAL REPORT FOR THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 57 (2006) (finding no evidence of profiling apparent in 
minority neighborhoods). 
7 See infra notes 271–272 and accompanying text. 
1174 NIREJ S. SEKHON [Vol. 101 
violation is insufficient to legitimate proactive policing arrests.  The costs 
and benefits of arrest distribution, just as with other policy choices, should 
be shared equally amongst all communities within a jurisdiction.  
Distributive justice principles also dovetail with a representation-
reinforcing theory of judicial review.  In tandem, the two suggest a much 
more active role for courts in constraining police departments’ discretion to 
ration arrests. 
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II demonstrates how scholars 
and courts have addressed the police “discretion problem.”  Legal scholars 
have not systematically accounted for how departmental discretion 
operates.  This is unsurprising given that constitutional criminal procedure 
has narrowly conceptualized police discretion in terms of individual 
officers’ assessments of individual suspects’ likely guilt.  Part III argues 
that departmental policies regarding geographic deployment, enforcement 
priority, and enforcement tactics drive proactive policing’s anti-egalitarian 
consequences.  Case studies on narcotics enforcement and quality-of-life 
policing demonstrate departmental choices’ salience in producing 
inequality.  Part IV evaluates departmental discretion through the lens of 
distributive justice and concludes that where popular politics is unable to 
prevent the unequal distribution of proactive policing arrests, courts should 
do so. 
II. THE “DISCRETION PROBLEM” 
Scholars and courts tend to localize the “discretion problem” to the 
moments leading up to and during contact between individual officers and 
civilians.  This conceptualization decouples police discretion from 
distributive justice—most significantly, it avoids the question of whether 
arrest policies’ benefits and burdens are fairly distributed across a 
jurisdiction.
8
  This Section accounts for the decoupling.  It begins with 
scholars rather than courts.  It was scholars, beginning in the late 1950s, 
who identified a “discretion problem.”  They suggested that police 
departments delegated excess policymaking discretion to individual officers 
and those officers, in turn, used that discretion inconsistently if not 
abusively.  Courts and more recent scholarship have continued to echo that 
conceptualization. 
A. THE “DISCOVERY” OF POLICE DISCRETION 
Scholars “discovered” the discretion problem in the 1950s.
9
  In 1956, 
 
8 See infra Part IV.A. 
9 SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, 1950–1990, at 6–7 (1993) (summarizing early research). 
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the American Bar Foundation (ABF) issued a report concluding that 
considerable discretion existed in policing.
10
  “Discovery” is a curious 
metaphor for describing an endemic feature of policing.  But, prior to the 
ABF report, scholars and lawyers tended to embrace the mythology of 
“complete enforcement”—i.e., the notion that police attempt to apprehend 
each and every violator of the criminal code.
11
  For early law and society 
scholars, the discretion problem brought the disjuncture between law and 
social practice into stark relief.  Early discretion scholars problematized the 
disjuncture at its most primary level: the individual officer. 
Early discretion scholars cast the discretion problem in terms of an 
inverted pyramid.  Ordinarily, one would expect the most senior members 
of a governmental institution to enjoy the greatest discretion.  In police 
departments, early police scholars contended, discretionary latitude 
appeared to increase down the line of command.
12
  Kenneth Culp Davis 
argued that this, in effect, rendered individual patrol officers “policy 
makers” for their beats.
13
  Davis noted that many police departments did not 
have policy manuals at all and, for those that did, the manuals said nothing 
about enforcement priorities.
14
  Taking cover under the rhetorical blanket of 
“full enforcement,” police department administrators deferred almost 
completely to patrolmen to decide when and against whom to enforce 
criminal laws.
15
  The absence of departmental intelligence as to crime’s 
distribution or the nature of officers’ practices compounded the discretion 
problem.
16
  In the absence of departmental directives, patrol officers were 
free to devise enforcement protocol based on hunch, habit, and bias.
17
  The 
early scholars were particularly troubled by officers’ decisions not to 
enforce criminal laws because these decisions were entirely invisible to 
 
10 See Michael Tonry, Foreword to DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at xiii–xiv (Lloyd 
E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993) (discussing the origins and influence of the ABF 
report). 
11 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION, at iv (1975). 
12 DAVIS, supra note 11, at v, 47, 99, 139; Tonry, supra note 10, at xiv–xv (summarizing 
ABF survey); JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 7 (1968). 
13 DAVIS, supra note 11, at 99, 139. 
14 Id. at 32–38. 
15 Id. at 52–53 (“The police assume full enforcement is required by [statute and 
ordinance], and when insufficient resources or good sense requires nonenforcement they also 
assume that they must do what they can to conceal the nonenforcement.  So the only open 
enforcement policy is one of full enforcement . . . .  Because of the false pretense of full 
enforcement, no studies are ever made to guide the formulation of enforcement policy.”). 
16 Id. at 41, 44. 
17 See id. at 46–47.  “Hunches” and “habits” may be a more polite way of talking about 
biases to the extent that officers’ expectations of criminality are racialized.  See L. Song 
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2042–52 
(2011) (reviewing the science of implicit bias). 




Early discretion scholarship reflects the mid-twentieth century’s 
scholarly zeitgeist.  Intellectuals were preoccupied with identifying the 
“authoritarian personality” in its various guises.
19
  The vivid memories of 
fascism’s horrors impelled scholars to scrutinize the psychological 
predilections of individuals who might be particularly susceptible to 
populist totalitarianism.  Police officers figured prominently as examples of 
the authoritarian personality.
20
  True to the times, intellectuals were not 
particularly moved by popular democracy’s capacity for restraining the 
authoritarian personality.  The ground between popular democracy and 
populist totalitarianism seemed precariously slippery.
21
  It is no wonder that 
intellectuals—the early police discretion scholars among them—were quick 
to posit political insulation, technocratic rationalization, and 
professionalization as the best approaches to containing and directing the 
authoritarian personality towards benevolent ends.
22
 
According to the early scholars, the locus of the discretion problem 
was the individual patrolman and the locus of the solution was departmental 
control.  Early scholars posited departmental authority as the best 
mechanism for restraining and guiding individual officers.  Kenneth Culp 
Davis, for example, argued that police departments should promulgate 
regulations following public comment, much like administrative agencies 
do.
23
  Other early scholars concurred, arguing for various combinations of 
external and internal rules regulating police officer discretion.
24
  The 
analogy between an administrative agency and a municipal police 
department is far from perfect.
25
  The differences between the two may 
 
18 Wayne R. LaFave, Police Rule Making and the Fourth Amendment: The Role of 
Courts, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 214–15 (characterizing early 
scholars’ concerns). 
19 T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 1–11 (1950); see also DAVID 
ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 29–30 (2008). 
20 SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 30, 39–43. 
21 Id. at 18–21 (discussing pluralist scholars’ anxieties about mass politics). 
22 Id. at 36–37. 
23 See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 100, 106, 113–20.  Davis argued that individual officers 
should have discretion to make decisions in individual situations, but should not have 
discretion to make “policy.”  Id. at 99, 139.  He didn’t, however, precisely articulate the 
difference between these two things. 
24 See, e.g., GEORGE E. BERKLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC POLICEMAN 29, 135–36 (1969) 
(arguing for internal rules with public comment); WALKER, supra note 9, at 154 (arguing for 
better departmental control over individual officers); Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling 
Discretion by Administrative Regulations, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 504–08 (1990) (arguing 
constitutional rules should encourage departments to create regulations). 
25 See Ronald J. Allen, The Police And Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle 
and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 96–97 (1976). 
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explain why police departments have, by and large, not heeded the early 
scholars’ recommendations.
26
  More significant for my purposes, however, 
is that early scholars embraced an officer–department dualism.  That 
dualism defined the field and continues to inform how contemporary 
scholars theorize the discretion problem. 
Although early scholars noted that non-white communities might bear 
the brunt of the discretion problem’s harmful consequences,
27
 their concern 
about discretion was not expressed in terms of racial disparity so much as 
fear of general arbitrariness.
28
  Even though contemporary legal scholarship 
on policing squarely addresses race, it echoes the early scholars’ officer–
department dualism, positing increased departmental regulation as the 
answer to the discretion problem.
29
  Moments of poorly calibrated officer 
discretion saturate popular discourse: police shootings, high-speed chases, 
and the like make for good news.  Even scholars who insist on race’s 
centrality in structuring law enforcement priority and protocol tend to 
reproduce the officer–department dichotomy.  Despite being considerably 
more sophisticated around race than early discretion scholarship,
30
 much 
contemporary criminal procedure scholarship still takes the individual 
officer as the most relevant unit of analysis.
31
  Similarly, contemporary race 
 
26 Although most large metropolitan police departments now have policy manuals, those 
manuals tend to focus on narrow personnel issues and not on enforcement priority or 
protocol as the early scholars had hoped.  See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, 
FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS 180–83 (1996); see also Elizabeth Joh, Breaking the Law to 
Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 159 (2009) 
(discussing internal police regulation of undercover operations). 
27 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 11, at iii, 113–20. 
28 See id. at 15.  The early scholars’ work addressed race in passing.  See id. at 161–62; 
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 77–80 (3d ed. 1994) (describing research 
based on fieldwork conducted in 1962).  The absence seems jarring particularly given the 
salience of racial unrest at the time and the police’s role in fomenting it.  See THE NAT’L 
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION 
ON CIVIL DISORDERS 301–07 (1968). 
29 See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 506–15 (2003) (noting that organizational culture accounts for officer 
behavior and arguing that it accounts for use of excessive force); Erik Luna, Transparent 
Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1140–41, 1156, 1167–69 (2000) (noting that excessive 
officer discretion leads to racial disparity and excessive force and suggesting department 
regulations as one possible solution); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 331, 373–74 (1998) (suggesting that officers are inclined to think that black 
motorists are more likely to have contraband). 
30 See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 17, at 2052–53 (arguing that recent psychological 
theories regarding “implicit bias” explain why police offers may inordinately target 
minorities); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth 
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 987–88 (1999) (using psychological theories of 
cognition to account for how officers perceive race). 
31 See Hadar Aviram & Daniel L. Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the 
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scholars tend to characterize departmental responsibility in terms of 




Some scholars have recognized that police departments are significant 
discretion-wielding actors.
33
  That recognition is implicit in work 
addressing the relationship between arrest disparity and narcotics 
enforcement
34
 as well as in work addressing “overenforcement” in minority 
communities.
35
  Scholars, however, have not systematically analyzed the 
incidents of departmental discretion or how those incidents specifically 
relate to egalitarianism.  This may be because scholars take their cues from 
courts and constitutional criminal procedure is not especially concerned 
with departmental discretion. 
 
Concept of Equity into Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 
424 (2009) (noting factors that bear on an officer’s decision to arrest or pursue 
investigation); Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 
75 (2009) (noting that “motivating officers to set aside inappropriate biases” is among the 
key solutions to racially disproportionate targeting); Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless 
Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199, 233 (arguing that 
technological innovation might be a solution to “the potential dangers associated with the 
discretion afforded to police officers in their day-to-day activities”); Kevin R. Johnson, How 
Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 
1005, 1007 (2009) (criticizing Supreme Court cases for allowing “profiling by law 
enforcement officers to go largely unchecked”); Maclin, supra note 29, at 378 (criticizing 
the probable cause requirement because it “fails to diminish the discretion possessed by 
officers, but may actually facilitate arbitrary seizures”); Richardson, supra note 17, at 2092–
97 (proposing changes in training and hiring that will reduce officer bias); Thompson, supra 
note 30, at 1002 (“Officers must offer race-neutral reasons for their conduct to survive 
constitutional scrutiny.”). 
32 See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 29, at 523; Capers, supra note 31, at 75; Brandon 
Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 54 (arguing that 
improper training and supervision lead to racial profiling). 
33 See SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 176–77 (noting that massive individual and 
departmental discretion is unavoidable); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1969, 2038 (2008). 
34 Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 265–67 (2002) (noting disparity in 
narcotics arrests); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1820 
(1998) (stating that aggressive narcotics policing in poor, minority neighborhoods tends to 
be an inexpensive way to generate arrests). 
35 See Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 695 (1998) 
(arguing that overenforcement and underenforcement in minority communities undermine 
social cohesion and norms); Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct 
“Outside The Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 665 (2006) 
(proposing a solution to overenforcement that uses non-deputized municipal actors to police 
minor offenses); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1720, 
1772 (2006) (criticizing policy choices that lead to the related phenomenon of 
underenforcement and overenforcement of criminal laws in minority communities). 
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B. COURTS 
Constitutional criminal procedure’s modern origin is rooted in federal 
courts’ efforts to contain racist, mob justice in the pre-civil rights South.
36
  
In other words, promoting egalitarianism was among the Court’s chief 
purposes in creating modern criminal procedure.  Over time, criminal 
procedure has increasingly focused on how individual police officers 
differentiate guilty from innocent individuals.  Ironically, that 
preoccupation has led criminal procedure away from questions of 
egalitarianism. 
1. Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment regulates officer discretion with a view to 
limiting searches and seizures that might unduly burden the “innocent.”
37
  
The Court has organized Fourth Amendment jurisprudence around how 
officers distinguish the prospectively innocent from the prospectively 
guilty.  The Court has done so to the exclusion of how individual officers, 
let alone departments, distinguish between categories of offenders.  And the 
Court has altogether written race out of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
The Fourth Amendment’s requirement of “individualized suspicion” 
highlights why courts conceptualize the discretion problem around 
individualized citizen–officer interactions.  The Fourth Amendment 
requires that an officer have either “probable cause,” or at least “reasonable 
suspicion based on articulable facts,” that a crime has occurred (or will 
occur) before the officer can legally detain and search an individual or her 
property.
38
  In theory, individualized suspicion ensures a quantum of 
certainty regarding criminal activity that protects innocent citizens from the 
inconvenience and indignity of a police search or seizure.
39
  Whether 
individualized suspicion exists is a judgment to be made by a particular 
 
36 See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 
91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1306 (1982); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern 
Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 56–57 (2000).  In the early cases, the Supreme 
Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to reverse convictions of poor black defendants who 
were very likely innocent of criminal wrongdoing.  See Klarman, supra, at 53, 57, 61. 
37 See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 77 VA. L. REV. 761, 765 
(1989) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is interpreted to protect innocent third parties). 
38 Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding a search conducted 
without a warrant based on probable cause is per se unreasonable), with Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that individualized suspicion based on articulable facts justifies 
police intrusion as an exception to the warrant requirement).  Because it is a less stringent 
standard, “individualized suspicion” permits a less intrusive police invasion than does 
“probable cause.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (holding that police intrusion on the grounds of 
“individualized suspicion” must be limited to a search for weapons only). 
39 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 




Under the Fourth Amendment, courts are agnostic on whether the 
police target one group of offenders as opposed to another.  The Court has 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to be “transubstantive”—i.e., it does not 
require that intrusions upon liberty or privacy be calibrated to the suspected 
offense’s severity.
41
  Once an officer has probable cause to believe that an 
individual is committing a crime, however minor, the officer may detain 
and search the suspected offender.  The Court has made it clear that it will 
not use the Fourth Amendment to restrain even outrageous exercises of 
police authority if there is any basis in the criminal code to think that a 
crime is occurring.
42
  The sheer number of criminal laws means that police 
have considerable discretion in choosing among different kinds of 
offenders.  As discussed in detail in Part III below, that discretion is not 
best conceptualized at the individual officer level. 
If there is individualized suspicion to believe that any crime has 
occurred, the Fourth Amendment is agnostic as to whether race animated 
the police’s enforcement decisions.
43
  In Whren v. United States, the Court 
held that an officer’s subjective motivation for detaining an individual is 
irrelevant to whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation.
44
  In Whren, 
undercover narcotics officers had probable cause to believe that Whren had 
 
40 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (“[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific 
and articulable facts which . . . reasonably warrant [an] intrusion.” (emphasis added)). 
41 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive 
Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 869–70 (2001) (arguing that the Fourth 
Amendment search standard should account for the substantive seriousness of the offense 
being investigated); accord AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 32–35 (1997) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment standard should be linked to 
the importance of the government’s purpose in searching). 
42 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 325–26 (2001) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment permits an officer to arrest for violating a seatbelt law). 
43 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
44 Id.  The Court has, in a limited subset of search cases, distinguished between an 
officer’s subjective motivation and a department’s “programmatic purpose.”  See City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44–45 (2000) (distinguishing Whren).  Police may 
conduct searches without individualized suspicion when the search advances a public 
welfare function that, in the first instance, is not simply “crime control.”  Id.; see also Illinois 
v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424–25 (2004) (finding a suspicionless checkpoint stop permissible 
where the purpose was to obtain information regarding a hit and run that had already 
occurred); Mich. Dep’t of State v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (finding a suspicionless 
stop at a drunk driving checkpoint permissible because of the state’s interest in preventing 
unsafe driving); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (finding a municipal 
health and safety inspection permissible without individualized suspicion because the 
purpose was not punitive).  No published opinion, however, suggests that a court has ever 
scrutinized a police department’s reasons for arresting one group of offenders versus another 
under the guise of ascertaining the department’s primary purpose. 
2012] REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICING 1181 
committed a minor traffic violation.  But the facts surrounding the detention 
suggested that the real reason the officers pulled Whren over was not for the 
relatively minor traffic violation, but because the officers thought Whren, 
an African-American male, had narcotics in his vehicle.
45
  Departmental 
regulations prohibited undercover narcotics officers from enforcing minor 
traffic violations.
46
  Whren argued that, absent the officers’ stereotype-
driven assumption that black motorists are likely to have narcotics, they 
would not have stopped him at all.  The Court rejected Whren’s argument 
that the “pretextual” stop violated the Fourth Amendment.
47
 
Whren emblematizes the Court’s refusal to use the Fourth Amendment 
to regulate race-based stops or promote adherence to departmental 
regulations.
48
  In Whren, the Court made clear that there would be no Fourth 
Amendment consequence if individual officers violate departmental 
regulations.
49
  This, in tandem with the Court’s transubstantive application 
of the Fourth Amendment, means that the Fourth Amendment has no role in 
regulating enforcement choices that have racial disparity.  In Whren, the 




2. Fourteenth Amendment 
Nominally, courts are willing to address the racial consequences of 
police discretion under the Fourteenth Amendment, but practically, courts 
have limited its application by localizing the inquiry to the moment of 
contact between individual police officers and citizens.  Much like in the 
Fourth Amendment context, the “discretion problem” is cognizable as a 
Fourteenth Amendment problem when realized at the individual level.
51
 
Equal protection claims have been most successfully advanced in the 
context of traffic stops where police use minor traffic infractions as a device 
 
45 Whren, 517 U.S. at 809. 
46 Id. at 815. 
47 Id. at 813. 
48 See LaFave, supra note 24, at 504–08. 
49 Whren, 517 U.S. at 815; see also Bertine v. Colorado, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987) 
(approving a police regulation that allowed officers discretion on whether to conduct 
suspicionless inventory searches). 
50 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally 
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
51 The Court has increasingly individualized equality rights in general.  See Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (reasoning that the Equal Protection 
Clause “protect[s] persons, not groups”).  This is true even in a context like voting rights 
where no individual could conceivably have “the right” to select the winning candidate.  See 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911–12 (1995). 
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for searching otherwise innocent minority motorists for narcotics.
52
  
Advocates for the campaign against racial profiling on the nation’s 
highways organized their legal and political message around the indignity 
and inconvenience of profiling on “innocent” minority motorists.
53
  Race is 
a bad proxy for guilt.
54
  And the “driving while black” (DWB) campaign 
was successful only to the extent that it helped cement the pithy, popular 
wisdom that profiling is “wrong.”  The DWB campaign, however, may very 
well have consolidated popular and legal disinterest in how the police parse 
the guilty from the guilty.
55
 
To challenge how the police parse the guilty from the guilty, a 
defendant must demonstrate that the police enforced a criminal law against 
him because of his membership in a protected class, e.g., race.
56
  In order to 
prevail on a “selective enforcement claim,” one must prove disparate 
impact and intentional discrimination.
57
  “Disparate impact” means that 
 
52 See, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 623–25 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing 
plaintiffs); ACLU OF N. CAL., THE CALIFORNIA DWB REPORT: A REPORT FROM THE 
HIGHWAYS, TRENCHES AND HALLS OF POWER IN CALIFORNIA 15–40 (2002), available at 
http://www.aclunc.org/library/publications/asset_upload_file305_3517.pdf (detailing 
individual profiling narratives); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other 
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 544, 564–65 (1997) (describing the allegations in Complaint, Wilkins v. Md. 
State Police, Civil No. MJG-93-468 (D. Md. 1993)); David A. Harris, The Stories, the 
Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 270–75 
(1999) (detailing the evidence of innocent, middle-class African-American victims of 
profiling).  By “successful,” I mean that such litigation has generated several settlement 
agreements.  See Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., In Landmark Racial Profiling Settlement, 
Arizona Law Enforcement Agents Agree to Major Reforms (Feb. 2, 2005), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/landmark-racial-profiling-settlement-arizona-law-
enforcement-agents-agree-major-refor; Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., In Landmark Racial 
Profiling Settlement, California Highway Patrol Agrees to Major Reforms (Feb. 27, 2003), 
http://www.aclunc.org/news/press_releases/in_landmark_racial_profiling_settlement,_
california_highway_patrol_agrees_to_major_reforms.shtml. 
53 See Devon Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1034–
35 (2002). 
54 See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION 119 (2007) (noting a study of traffic 
stops that indicates a higher “hit rate” for white drivers than minority drivers). 
55 See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 571, 593–94 (2003).  Even where there is documented racial disparity in stop and 
search rates, it does not necessarily follow that there is racial disparity in arrest rates.  
Compare Bernard Harcourt, Henry Louis Gates and Racial Profiling: What’s the Problem? 
2–3 (John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 482, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474809 (summarizing profiling studies), with Jeffrey Fagan et al., 
An Analysis of the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 
102 J. AM. STATISTICAL ASS’N 813, 815–16 (2007) (summarizing New York’s stop and frisk 
study). 
56 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). 
57 See id. (noting that selective enforcement claims are governed by “ordinary equal 
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there is a universe of “similarly situated” offenders, i.e., offenders who are 
not members of the protected group and against whom the police did not 
enforce the criminal law at issue.  For example, a minority motorist who 
alleges selective enforcement of the speed limit would have to demonstrate 
that law enforcement permitted white individuals to speed with impunity 
while enforcing the speed limit against minority motorists.  To succeed, the 
minority challenger would also have to prove that the police intentionally 
targeted minority motorists on account of their race.  Proving racial animus 
or “intent” is difficult.
58
  It is more difficult to establish a case of selective 
enforcement than other kinds of discrimination because the Court has made 
it difficult to even obtain discovery.
59
 
The Supreme Court has held that, to obtain discovery for a selective 
enforcement claim in a criminal case, a defendant must demonstrate that 
“similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, 
but were not.”
60
  To satisfy the “similarly situated” requirement, courts have 
required defendants to produce evidence of offenders who are virtually 
identical to the defendant in every regard save for race.
61
  In United States 
v. Barlow, for instance, the Seventh Circuit elided the requirement for 
individualized suspicion with that for similarly situated offenders.
62
  Barlow 
argued that federal agents targeted black passengers for investigation at 
Chicago’s main train station.  Rejecting his selective enforcement claim, the 
Seventh Circuit stated that, to be similarly situated, white offenders would 
have had to engage in the same microbehaviors (“i.e., looking nervously 
over their shoulders”) that the arresting officers claimed drew their attention 
to Barlow.
63
  Such a narrow interpretation of the similarly situated 
requirement makes it virtually impossible to obtain discovery regarding, let 
alone to challenge, how police officers weigh various factors in 
distinguishing different categories of offenders.  For example, a criminal 
defendant might charge that the police more intensively enforce narcotics 
laws in a particular neighborhood on account of race.  There will, however, 
 
protection standards”). 
58 Id. at 463–64 (noting the standard for proving a claim is “demanding”). 
59 In United States v. Armstrong, the Court held that defendants must show disparate 
impact just to obtain discovery relating to their claim of selective enforcement.  Id. at 465.  
The Court made it clear that its purpose in so requiring was to make selective enforcement 
claims more difficult.  Id. at 464–66; see also United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 863–64 
(2002) (per curiam) (noting that statistics showing blacks are charged with death-eligible 
offenses more frequently than whites does not constitute evidence of disparate impact). 
60 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468. 
61 See United States v. Barlow, 310 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Turner, 104 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 1997). 
62 Barlow, 310 F.3d at 1012. 
63 Id. 
1184 NIREJ S. SEKHON [Vol. 101 
always be a host of racial and non-racial differences that characterize 
offender populations across geographic boundaries.  The Ninth Circuit 
foreclosed just such an inquiry in United States v. Turner.
64
  A selective 
enforcement claim is viable only in the unlikely event that there is a white 
offender virtually identical to the defendant who the arresting officer chose 
not to target.
65
  As a practical matter, individual officers are rarely in such a 
position. 
Challenging police discretion under the Fourteenth Amendment is 
most plausible under the Due Process Clause.  So-called vagueness 
challenges are rare, and the Court’s opinions further demonstrate the extent 
to which it has organized criminal procedure around the individual officer–
citizen encounter. 
The Court will declare a criminal statute void for vagueness if it is 
insufficiently specific to apprise an ordinary person of the conduct that the 
legislature has criminalized.
66
  That is to say that the vague statute does not 
adequately distinguish guilty from innocent conduct and “entrusts 
lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his 
beat.”
67
  The Court has been particularly skeptical of anti-loitering-type 
statutes because of fear that police enforce such laws against minorities and 
political dissenters.
68
  The Court has used vagueness doctrine as a kind of 
surrogate for equal protection: vagueness doctrine allows the Court to 
control for prospective racial harms that excessive officer discretion may 
engender without having to address race squarely.
69
 
In its most recent opinion voiding for vagueness, the Court invalidated 
a Chicago gang-loitering ordinance.
70
  The ordinance permitted law 
enforcement to arrest suspected gang members for failing to disperse on 
command.
71
  The Court rejected Chicago’s argument that departmental 
 
64 See Turner, 104 F.3d at 1185 (noting that similarly situated white offenders would 
have to be “gang members who sold large quantities of crack”); see also United States v. 
Alcaraz-Arellano, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1232 (D. Kan. 2004) (explaining that, to be 
similarly situated, white offenders had to display the same indicators of drug trafficking that 
minority defendants did). 
65 See United States v. Dixon, 486 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that to 
qualify as similarly situated offenders must have been overlooked by the same officers that 
arrested defendant). 
66 See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). 
67 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 360 (1983)). 
68 See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 163. 
69 Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, 
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 647 (1997). 
70 Morales, 527 U.S. at 51. 
71 Id. at 47. 
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regulations restricting enforcement sufficed to control individual officer 
discretion.
72
  Instead, choices about where and how to enforce accounted for 
the high number of minority arrests pursuant to the ordinance.
73
  
Nonetheless, the opinion casts the “discretion problem” as one of individual 
officers haphazardly enforcing an ordinance that fails to adequately 
distinguish the innocent from the guilty.  However, as noted by Debra 
Livingston in detail,
74
 even narrowly drafted criminal laws permit 
considerable officer discretion, particularly when considered as an entire 
body of law.
75
  Morales is deeply flawed because it assumes both the 
primacy of individual officer discretion in generating racial harm and that 
statutory language has the unmediated capacity to constrain police 
discretion.  Neither is true. 
III. DEPARTMENTAL DISCRETION 
Scholars have documented that minorities and the poor are more likely 
to be arrested and incarcerated than non-minorities and the middle class.
76
  
This Section demonstrates that such disparities are not the simple 
consequence of law-breaking patterns or individual officers’ biases.
77
  How 
arrests are distributed across a jurisdiction is not the aggregate effect of 
 
72 Id. at 62–64. 
73 See infra Part III.B.2.ii. 
74 Livingston, supra note 69, at 616–17, 629, 650. 
75 See infra notes 142–159 and accompanying text.  Ironically, Professor Livingston 
argues that the answer to excessive discretion in the order-maintenance context is to pass 
more criminal laws authorizing order maintenance.  See Livingston, supra note 69, at 560, 
626, 635–36. 
76 See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 5, at 67, 104, 112–13. 
77 Criminology tends to suggest that “attitudinal factors,” such as racial animus, do not 
play a significant role in explaining how patrol officers exercise their arrest authority.  See 
Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making During 
Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 426 (2005) (concluding that race predicts how officers 
form suspicions, but not how they make arrest decisions); Allison T. Chappell et al., The 
Organizational Determinants of Police Arrest Decisions, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 287, 302 
(2006) (concluding that situational determinants are more important than structural ones); 
Robert E. Worden, Situational and Attitudinal Explanations of Police Behavior: A 
Theoretical Reappraisal and Empirical Assessment, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667, 702 (1989) 
(noting empirical studies that suggest officers’ attitudes do not inform their arrest 
decisionmaking).  Rather, “situational factors” go much farther in explaining officer choices.  
See Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity and Discretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on 
Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 246–47 (1984) (discussing how 
class issues and the tendency of police to attach pejorative traits to minority suspects may 
contribute to racial disparities in arrests); see also Scott W. Phillips & Sean P. Varano, 
Police Criminal Charging Decisions: An Examination of Post-Arrest Decision Making, 36 J. 
CRIM. JUST. 307, 308 (2008) (summarizing previous research on situational factors and arrest 
decisions). 
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individual officers’ discretionary decisions.  Rather, it is departmental 
choiceschoices made by policymakers and administratorsthat 
determine how arrests are distributed.  This picture of departmental 
discretion suggests that many categories of arrests should be conceived as 
distributive phenomena.  Departmental choices create benefits and burdens 
for individuals and communities.  Accordingly, police departments should 
calibrate those choices to achieve egalitarian results.  That discussion is 
taken up in Part IV. 
Subsection A below shows how, in the proactive policing context, 
departmental policies regarding geographic deployment, enforcement 
priority, and enforcement tactics determine how the benefits and burdens of 
policing are distributed.  Modern policing relies heavily on arrests as a 
crime-control strategy.  That strategy, coupled with the dramatic expansion 
of mala prohibita offenses, has conferred enormous discretion upon police 
departments to decide when, where, and by what means (if at all) to enforce 
criminal laws.  Subsection B illustrates how departmental discretion drives 
inequality in the narcotics and quality-of-life contexts. 
A. DEPARTMENTAL DISCRETION AND PROACTIVE POLICING 
The proactive policing model relies on departmental decisionmakers’ 
discretion—i.e., the discretion of policymakers and administrators above 
the individual officer level—to determine how arrests are distributed across 
a jurisdiction and, by extension, arrestees’ demographic profile.  In 
proactive policing, the police themselves must generate knowledge and 
enforcement priorities regarding crime.  This model is in contrast to 
“reactive” policing, where the police respond to specific reports of criminal 
misconduct, typically made by victims or witnesses. 
“Vice,” public nuisance, and traffic crimes are examples of proactive 
policing.  These crimes do not typically involve a particularized victim.  
Some related crimes, such as drunk driving, are distinct from vice and 
minor crimes because they create inordinate risk of generating a 
particularized victim.  In stark contrast, the victims of vice crimes are often 
complicit in or responsible for the criminalized activity, as in the hapless 
drug addict who might be cast as a “victim” of narcotics trafficking.  
Victims of vice crimes may also be members of a community who are 
exposed to illicit activity’s secondary consequences, such as increased 
property crimes associated with narcotics or the aesthetic harms associated 
with graffiti.
78
  But, such “victims” are not particularized in the same way 
 
78 Some would suggest that “community policing” is the best way to address the needs of 
such victims.  In theory, community policing “seeks to address the causes of crime and 
reduce the fear of crime and social disorder through problem-solving strategies and police- 
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as is typically true in reactive policing.
79
  This distinction matters because 
arrest disparity for victim-initiated crimes has remained relatively stable 
since the 1970s.
80
  Proactive policing, particularly narcotics enforcement, 
accounts for the massive increases in minority incarceration rates since the 
1970s.
81




Departmental discretion operates in three related dimensions: 
geographic deployment, enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics.  
Geographic deployment refers to where in a jurisdiction officers are 
deployed.  Urban police departments are typically segmented into 
precincts.
83
  Patrol officers are typically assigned not only to a particular 
precinct, but to details that have specified geographic boundaries.
84
  
Specialized units may also be assigned to particular precincts.  This, for 
example, would likely be true for undercover units focusing on small-scale 
narcotics transactions or other minor crimes.
85
  Given the entrenched 




community partnerships.”  See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMMUNITY POLICING IN LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 1997 AND 1999, 
at 1 (rev. 2003).  In practice, however, there is considerable variation and debate as to what 
community policing means.  See Edward R. Maguire & Charles M. Katz, Community 
Policing, Loose Coupling, and Sensemaking in American Police Agencies, 19 JUST. Q. 503, 
510–11 (2002).  While many departments report that they are engaged in “community 
policing,” this claim may only be loosely related to what the department is actually doing.  
See id. at 530.  Federal grant-reporting requirements may also have created incentives for 
departments to report that they are doing community policing when they are not.  See id. 
79 “Victim” as a social category is, in part, constituted through state action.  “Harm” and 
“victims” seem to be ever widening social categories.  See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION 
OF ORDER 212 (2001); see also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 75–110 
(2007). 
80 TONRY, supra note 5, at 112–13 (explaining that the war on drugs, not violent crime 
rates, accounts for dramatic increases in the black incarceration rate). 
81 Id. at 4, 6 (arguing that federal policymakers in the Reagan and Bush administrations 
knew racial disparity would result from the federal “war on drugs”); DAVID GARLAND, THE 
CULTURE OF CONTROL 132 (2001). 
82 Cf. WILSON, supra note 12, at 86, 100 (arguing that departmental discretion has a 
marked impact on policing vice and minor crimes). 
83 For example, the New York Police Department (NYPD) is divided into numerous 
precincts.  See Precincts, NYPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/home/precincts.shtml 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2011). 
84 EDWARD CONLON, BLUE BLOOD 4 (2004). 
85 Id. at 149 (noting that anti-crime teams that focus on street-level narcotics operate at 
the precinct level in the NYPD); Tal Klement & Elizabeth Siggins, A Window of 
Opportunity: Addressing The Complexities of the Relationship Between Drug Enforcement 
and Racial Disparity in Seattle, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 165, 193 (2003) (noting the same for 
Seattle). 
86 See LAMBERTH, supra note 6, at 57; Capers, supra note 31, at 47. 
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different precincts will often encompass populations with different 
demographic profiles.
87
  How police departments distribute police officers 
among and within precincts will play a significant role in determining the 
demographic profile of arrestees.  This does not simply mean that arrestees 
will be “whiter” in whiter precincts (or more minority in minority 
precincts).
88
  Officers may be deployed inordinately in a white precinct 
because its residents have political clout and believe that minorities are 
largely responsible for crime in the precinct.
89
  But the mere presence of 
police officers in a particular place does not, by itself, mean that there will 
be arrests at all, let alone minority arrests.
90
 
Departmental decisions regarding enforcement priority will determine 
what kinds of crimes (if any) officers in a particular location will 
concentrate on.  The range of criminalized conduct is vast.
91
  It is, therefore, 
common for police to systematically overlook an entire range of crimes, 
particularly minor, malum in se ones.
92
  It may well be that a particular 
community’s mores permit certain forms of criminalized misconduct.
93
  If 
such conduct is also viewed as unimportant by the police department, 
officers will have little incentive to enforce against it.
94
  A departmental 
decision to begin enforcing against erstwhile unenforced, minor crimes will 
have a significant effect on individual officers’ behavior.
95
  This has proven 
particularly true where a department’s choices are part of a wider policy 
program to interdict “disorderly” behavior under the rubric of “quality-of-
life” policing.
96
  Another common example is in the narcotics context: 
departments may elect to focus on particular narcotics over others for a host 
 
87 See, e.g., Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 195–98, 249 nn.39, 42, 45 & 48 
(describing demographic profiles of the Seattle Police Department’s four precincts). 
88 See id. at 197–98, 249 n.48 (noting that 60% of those arrested in Seattle’s West 
Precinct for a drug violation were non-white even though the vast majority of residents in the 
precinct are white). 
89 Id. at 205. 
90 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Hassell, Variations in Police Patrol Practices, 30 POLICING 
257, 268 (2007) (noting that policing tactics may vary considerably among precincts in one 
police department). 
91 See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing “overcriminalization”). 
92 While rarely memorialized in official policy, selective non-enforcement of the 
criminal code is a long-recognized fact of policing.  See supra notes 12–18 and 
accompanying text. 
93 See SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS 79, 359–60 (2006) (noting that 
residents of some inner city communities accept “backroom negotiation” between police and 
gang leaders that would not be tolerated in middle-class communities). 
94 See id. at 359. 
95 See WILSON, supra note 12, at 100. 
96 See infra Part III.B.2.i (discussing a quality-of-life policing case study). 
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of reasons, or none at all.
97
 
Departmental decisions regarding enforcement priority are tightly 
braided with decisions about enforcement tactics.  The former determines 
what misconduct to focus upon while the latter determines how to focus 
upon it.  Making arrests is, in and of itself, a significant tactical choice.  
Police departments have a host of other tactics available, and maintaining a 
uniform police presence in a park may better deter homeless people from 
sleeping there than does arresting the occasional sleeper.  A department 
might elect to increase arrest rates for particular kinds of conduct in 
different ways.  For example, a department might incentivize patrol officers 
to make more arrests than they ordinarily would.
98
  Patrol represents the 
largest portion of a department’s sworn force.
99
  Typically, patrol officers 
tend towards leniency and make fewer arrests than they have opportunities 
to make.
100
  A departmental decision requiring patrol officers to make 
arrests can very quickly change that, as occurred in New York City when it 
adopted a version of “broken windows” policing in the 1990s.
101
  
Departments may also create (or enlarge) specialized, arrest-intensive units 
for particular categories of offenses.  For example, undercover units that 
focus on street crimes will generate significantly more arrests per officer 
than does patrol.
102
  Choices about whether to carry out one kind of 
operation or another will also have consequences for the volume and nature 
of arrests.  For example, buy-bust operations targeting street-level narcotics 
transactions are likely to yield more arrests (but less contraband) over time 
than warrant-based operations targeting indoor transactions.
103
 
The specific processes by which the three modes of departmental 
discretion operate are often opaque.  Take a department’s decision to 
 
97 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing a narcotics enforcement case study). 
98 See, e.g., Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 199.  This may be why patrol officers 
are typically the subject of observational criminological studies.  See, e.g., Alpert et al., 
supra note 77, at 426; Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity & Discretionary Justice: Race and 
Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 239 (1984). 
99 See DAVID E. BARLOW & MELISSA HICKMAN BARLOW, POLICE IN A MULTICULTURAL 
SOCIETY 14 (2000) (discussing a study that found patrol officers spend less than 15% of on-
duty time fighting crime); see also CONLON, supra note 84, at 158 (“On patrol, [officers] 
dealt with the fluid whole of peoples’ lives,” not just “criminals.”).  Even calls for service 
tend not to be arrest-intensive.  See David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to 
Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 44, 49–
51, 57 (2009). 
100 See WILSON, supra note 12, at 49. 
101 See infra Part III.B.2.i. 
102 See, e.g., CONLON, supra note 84, at 158 (comparing the author’s work on a street-
crimes unit to that he did while on patrol). 
103 See, e.g., Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding 
Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 122–23 (2006). 
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generate more arrests through its patrol unit.
104
  To the extent that patrol 
officers are directed to make more arrests, it is often unclear as to how that 
mandate is transmitted.  Police departments are loath to admit that officers 
have “arrest quotas.”  But, it periodically emerges that a particular 
department has quotas (or the functional equivalent thereof).
105
  Sometimes 
it is possible to ascertain how senior department personnel make choices 
about officer deployment and enforcement priority,
106
 but that is rare.  A 
host of budget and personnel decisions might account for why one precinct 
has more undercover street-crimes officers than another.
107
 
Neither politics nor law compels police departments to be transparent 
about how they exercise discretion.  The history of modern policing 
suggests why this is true.  Bureaucratization and political insulation are the 
modern police department’s birth traits.
108
  Rationalized by a new “crime 
control” ethos in the mid-twentieth century,
109
 the institutional shifts that 
gave rise to the modern police department generated new capacity for the 
kinds of choices described above.  Bureaucratization and political insulation 
also deepened departments’ commitment to using arrests to achieve crime 
control while a steadily expanding criminal code increased the opportunities 
 
104 See infra Part III.B.2.i (discussing quality-of-life policing). 
105 See Alice Gendar, NYPD Captain Allegedly Caught in Arrest Quota Fixing, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Nov. 17, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
ny_crime/2007/11/14/2007-11-14_nypd_captain_allegedly_caught_in_arrest_-1.html; Jim 
Hoffer, N.Y.P.D. Officers Under “Quota” Pressure, WABC (March 3, 2010), 
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/investigators&id=7307336; John Marzulli, 
We Fabricated Drug Charges Against Innocent People to Meet Arrest Quotas, Former 
Detective Testifies, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 13, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-
10-13/news/30291567_1_nypd-narcotics-detective-false-arrest-suit-henry-tavarez; Graham 
Rayman, The NYPD Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct, VILLAGE VOICE, May 4, 2010, at 
12; see also Michael Murray, Why Arrest Quotas Are Wrong, POLICEMAN’S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOC. MAG. (Spring 2005), available at http://www.nycpba.org/publications/mag-05-
spring/murray.html. 
106 See infra Part III.B.2.ii. 
107 See infra Part III.B.2.i.  Even those criminologists that study departments’ 
organizational structure offer few clues as to how departmental decisions are made.  See 
generally EDWARD R. MAGUIRE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN POLICE 
AGENCIES 31, 76, 90, 99 (2003) (hypothesizing as to why different departments have 
different structures). 
108 See SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 35–36; but see John P. Crank & Robert Langworthy, 
An Institutional Perspective of Policing, 83 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 338, 342 (1992) 
(explaining that “legitimacy” is best understood in terms of police departments’ relationship 
with other powerful actors whose decisions affect the continued flow of resources to the 
department). 
109 “Crime control” here is intended as a narrative about police purpose that police 
departments project and in which there is widespread belief.  John P. Crank, Institutional 
Theory of the Police: A Review of the State of the Art, 26 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE 
STRATEGIES MGMT. 186, 189, 194 (2003) (referring to such narratives as mythologies). 
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for doing so. 
1. Bureaucratization and Political Insulation 
Modern police departments are hierarchical, command-and-control 
institutions that rely heavily on arrests in order to demonstrate their 
effectiveness.  Paradoxically, in the proactive policing context, arrests often 




The modern, urban police department took form in the mid-twentieth 
century.  Its birth history is well documented, so only a caption version is 
provided here.
111
  Well into the twentieth century, urban police departments 
were cogs in urban machine politics.
112
  Police departments were prime 
sources of patronage jobs.
113
  The beat cop was as much a sub-local 
functionary for the political machine as he was a watchman ensuring some 
measure of order on his beat.
114
  He enjoyed substantial discretion to 
enforce or not enforce the criminal code as necessary to maintain a level of 
order consistent with community mores.  Depending on the neighborhood, 
this frequently entailed permitting a fair amount of criminal misconduct.
115
  
As political functionary, the beat cop was the political machine’s agent, 
gathering and dispensing information for his own benefit and the machine’s 
sustenance.
116
  The beat cop had a granular knowledge of the landscape and 
those who populated it.  And arrests were not the preferred, let alone 
mandated, technique for controlling crime.
117
 
Corruption was an endemic feature of watchman-style policing and 
was among the most salient rallying cries for reformers in the twentieth 
 
110 See Harcourt, supra note 55, at 18 (quoting the former New Jersey attorney general); 
TONRY, supra note 5, at 106. 
111 See, e.g., BARLOW & BARLOW, supra note 99, at 19–46; SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 
31–36. 
112 See BARLOW & BARLOW, supra note 99, at 31. 
113 See id. 
114 See ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME 27 (1999) (describing the NYPD in 
early twentieth century); WILSON, supra note 12, at 31–32; see also LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 149–50 (1993) (describing 
policing in the nineteenth century). 
115 See SILVERMAN, supra note 114, at 27.  This dynamic still prevails in poor, urban 
communities.  See VENKATESH, supra note 93, at 7–8, 200–04 (arguing that police do not 
enforce law to the hilt when community mores do not permit it); Natapoff, supra note 35, at 
1747. 
116 See LUC SANTE, LOW LIFE 237–43 (1991) (describing NYPD in the nineteenth 
century). 
117 See WILSON, supra note 12, at 49. 
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century.
118
  The structure of big-city politics in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries encouraged police officers to disregard crime for a 
price.
119
  This was in grave misstep with Americans’ increasing anxieties 
about crime and cities during the post-war period.
120
  It was in that vein that 
the first wave of discretion scholars focused on big-city beat cops.
121
  
Professor Sklansky has persuasively argued that police reform in the mid-
twentieth century resonated with a new ethos of post-war, American 
democracy: “pluralism.”  Pluralist democracy checked the potential danger 
of populist fanaticism by insulating technocratic decisionmaking 
apparatuses from mass politics.
122
 
The chief mandate for reformed police departments was “crime 
control.”  And Chief William Parker’s Los Angeles Police Department 
(LAPD) in the 1950s was a progenitor of the new model for urban police 
departments: a crime-control technocracy.
123
  Rigidly hierarchical, it relied 
on centralized command for its squad-car-bound force.  The LAPD’s 
leadership, as would be true of the “reformed” police departments in other 
big cities, enjoyed considerable autonomy from elected office holders.
124
  
This arrangement continues to define police departments in many big, 
American cities.
125
  This is not to say that modern police departments 
 
118 See SANTE, supra note 116, at 240 (describing bribery in the NYPD); see also 
GARLAND, supra note 81, at 114–15 (describing police “professionalization”); SKLANSKY, 
supra note 19, at 35–36 (discussing the Wickersham Commission and reform movement). 
119 See MIKE ROYKO, BOSS: RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO 107–13 (2d ed. 1988) 
(describing corruption in Chicago); SILVERMAN, supra note 114, at 27–28 (describing 
corruption in New York City). 
120 See GARLAND, supra note 81, 152–54; SIMON, supra note 79, at 90–93; Stuntz, supra 
note 33, at 2000–05 (discussing “white flight” from cities and fear of crime). 
121 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 11, at 41 (discussing the Chicago Police Department). 
122 SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 34–38. 
123 See SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 36; see also MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ 250–51 
(2d ed. 2006). 
124 See id. at 36–37. 
125 Most police departments are controlled at the municipal level.  See MATTHEW J. 
HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT 
1 (2003).  And in the largest American cities, police chiefs are appointed, not elected.  See 
Pelpia Trip, More Information on Dallas Police Chief David Kunkle, CW33 NEWS (Nov. 11, 
2009), http://www.the33tv.com/news/kdaf-dallas-police-chief-david-kunkle-story,0,5569866
.story;  Letter from Frank Fairbanks, Phoenix City Manager, to Jack Harris, Chief of Phoenix 
Police Dep’t (May 5, 2009), available at http://www.phoenix.gov/police/public_safety_
manager_duties.pdf; Press Release, City of Houston, Mayor Bill White Announces Police 
Chief Nominee (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.houstontx.gov/mayor/
press/20040227.html; Press Release, City of San Jose, National Search for Police Chief Ends 
in San Jose (Jan. 6, 2004), available at http://www.sanjoseca.gov/cityManager/releases/
2004-01-06_policechief.pdf; CITY OF SAN DIEGO, MANAGER’S REPORT, No. 03-164 (July 25, 
2003), available at http://docs.sandiego.gov/reportstocouncil/2003/03-164.pdf; Office of the 
Chief, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO POLICE, http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/office.asp#LEGAL 
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operate without political constraint.
126
  In order for senior personnel to 
maintain their positions and for the department to maximize its funding 
stream, it must demonstrate that it is advancing crime control.  The 
audiences for such demonstrations of legitimacy are typically other 
institutional actors,
127
 although it might on occasion be the general public—
especially when a heinous crime captures public attention or when there is a 
generalized sense that crime is “out of control.”  In the latter case, creating 
the impression that a department is controlling crime need not mean that it 
is actually doing so.
128
  Similarly, making arrests need not mean that a 
police department is actually reducing crime.
129
 
Arrest is not only a key instrument in the modern police department’s 
crime-control arsenal, it is an emblem of whether a police department is 
satisfying its crime-control mandate.  Influenced by Fordist theories of 
industrial efficiency and postwar anxiety about popular democracy,
130
 the 
new policing ethos abstracted crime control from the life of any particular 
neighborhood.  The new ethos engendered what has become a broadly 
shared sense that making arrests is, itself, tantamount to crime control.
131
  
That arrests have this symbolic significance flows from the premium 
modern policing places on both crime control and measurability.  Arrests, 
 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2011); Office of the Chief of Police, LAPD, http://www.lapdonline.org/
inside_the_lapd/content_basic_view/834 (last visited Sept. 27, 2011); Profile of Charles 
Ramsey, PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, www.phillypolice.com/about/leadership/charles-h-ramsey/ 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2011); Profile of Raymond W. Kelly, NYPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/
nypd/html/administration/headquarters_co.shtml (last visited Sept. 27, 2011); 
Superintendent’s Office, CHI. POLICE DEP’T, https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/
portal/ClearPath/About%20CPD/Bureaus/Superintendent%27s%20Office (last visited Sept. 
27, 2011). 
126 See, e.g., Crank & Langworthy, supra note 108, at 342. 
127 See id. (describing these actors as “sovereigns”). 
128 See Crank, supra note 109, at 194 (summarizing research on the creation of 
specialized gang units). 
129 HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 122–25 (explaining that whether racial targeting 
decreases crime depends on the relative elasticity of different groups to policing). 
130 See SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at 26. 
131 See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 113, 139 (noting that academics have modeled 
police “success” in narcotics interdiction context by “hit rate,” which is the identification of 
an arrestable offense).  This view is not universal.  At least some argue that the “community 
policing” movement expressly questions this view and centralization more generally.  See 
KELLING & COLES, supra note 26, at 158, 165 (advocating for community policing that 
entails greater officer discretion vis-à-vis the police department).  Community policing was 
supposed to deemphasize arrests in favor of community engagement and more holistic 
approaches to community problem solving.  See id.  In practice, though, many police 
departments have enacted “community policing” in a top-down fashion that is a hallmark of 
a centralized police bureaucracy.  See SILVERMAN, supra note 114, at 17. 
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like certain kinds of crime, are readily measurable.
132
  Some crime is 
parsed, catalogued, and studied by severity and distribution.
133
  The kinds of 
crimes that most readily lend to measurement, however, are the same 
victim- or witness-reported crimes that reactive policing is organized 
around.  The preeminent measure of unreported crime in the United States 
is the Department of Justice’s Crime Victims’ Survey.
134
  As the title 
suggests, the DOJ conducts a telephonic survey designed to estimate how 
many victims there are of certain enumerated crimes.  The survey does not 
include the vice or minor crimes that proactive policing is typically 
concerned with.
135
  On the other hand, the Uniform Crime Reports, which 
tabulate arrests, do include data for vice or minor crimes.
136
 
Arrests play a contradictory and circular role in proactive policing.  
They are often held out both as proof of the need for crime control and as 
evidence of police enforcement’s efficacy.
137
  This contradiction is apparent 
with narcotics enforcement, where a high minority-arrest rate is used to 
show that the minority-offense rate is high.
138
  Even the Supreme Court has 
indulged in this circularity.
139
  The self-reinforcing nature of arrest rates in 
the proactive policing context likely entrenches the institutional 
arrangements that reproduce racial disparity.  For example, take 
specialization.  Modern, urban police departments tend to have a range of 
specialized units for narcotics, gangs, street crimes, domestic violence, and 
 
132 See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 124. 
133 Data is a hallmark of modern policing; the federal Uniform Crime Records came into 
existence after World War II.  Compstat may represent the culmination of this process.  See 
GARLAND, supra note 81, at 115 (discussing “computerization” and the use of the 
information technology in the 1980s and 1990s).  Compstat is a data-driven application that 
allows police departments to track the geographic distribution of criminal incidents and 
complaints.  See SILVERMAN, supra note 114, at 103–04.  The NYPD pioneered Compstat in 
the 1990s and it has subsequently spread to numerous other urban law enforcement agencies.  
Id. at 123–24.  But see William K. Rashbaum, Retired Officers Raise Questions on Crime 
Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at A1 (reporting that precinct commanders and 
administrators manipulated Compstat data to favorably impact crime rate statistics for their 
precinct); but cf. Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Idle Comstat Meetings, BALT. SUN (Apr. 9, 
2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-04-09/news/bal-md.ci.comstat08apr09_1_
comstat-police-department-s-operations-anthony-guglielmi (reporting on Baltimore Police 
Department’s suspensions of Compstat use due to the “staff friction” it caused). 




137 Harcourt, supra note 55, at 18.  It is not state officials that are the only ones 
responsible for engaging in such circularity.  See, e.g., Marc Lacey, U.S. Cites 175 Arrests of 
Traffickers in Drug Ring, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A15. 
138 See TONRY, supra note 5, at 106. 
139 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469–70 (1996). 
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drunk driving.  Arrest and specialization dovetail in that specialized units 
are often arrest-intensive.
140
  Once created, a specialized unit will tend to 
generate arrests and intelligence that reinforce its very existence.  If 
specialized undercover narcotics units are concentrated in minority 
neighborhoods, those units will generate arrests and intelligence regarding 
minority narcotics activity.  This may create the impression that minorities 




It is in the proactive policing context that police departments have the 
greatest discretion in shaping demographic outcomes.  This is not just 
because of modern police departments’ institutional structure, but because 
legislatures have generated a vast range of opportunities for police 
departments to make such choices. 
2. Expansive Enforcement Opportunity 
Legislatures have created virtually bottomless pools of prospective 
offenders by creating evermore mala prohibita offenses.  Doing so has 
amplified departmental discretion. 
Federal and state criminal codes achieved binding-busting girth in the 
twentieth century.  In most jurisdictions, the number of crimes increased 
twofold, if not substantially more.
142
  Some of the growth is attributable to 
the need (or perceived need) to regulate new, modern behaviors such as 
vehicular crimes and identity theft.  But legislatures have also demonstrated 
remarkable capacity for proliferating redundant crimes.
143
  Legal scholars 
have criticized the phenomenon, referring to it as “overcriminalization.”
144
  
The term captures both the sheer number of crimes and the vast swaths of 
behavior those crimes encompass.  And much of that behavior is not malum 
in se, as in paradigmatic crimes such as murder, robbery, and the like.  For 
example, narcotics convictions account for most of the dramatic increase in 
 
140 See, e.g., CONLON, supra note 84, at 158 (contrasting drug details with patrols); 
HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE 20 (2008) 
(stating that one-half of marijuana arrests in New York are made by specialized units); 
Jennifer R. Wynn, Can Zero Tolerance Last? Voices From Inside the Precinct, in ZERO 
TOLERANCE 107, 112 (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 2001) (noting that a small 
number of officers made the most arrests in NYPD).  But cf. Fagan et. al., supra note 55, at 
815–16, 820 (noting that stops tend not to produce arrests). 
141 See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 149 (discussing “ratchet effect”). 
142 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 514–15 (2001) (describing state and federal criminal codes). 
143 See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 
527–28 (2000) (describing the numerous incarnations of assault and larceny in California). 
144 See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 
713 & n.49 (2005) (citing numerous criticisms of the phenomenon). 
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incarceration rates in the United States since the 1970s.
145
 
Overcriminalization increases opportunities for enforcement (and non-
enforcement) of the criminal code.  Overcriminalization adds an 
exclamation point to the long-acknowledged fact that complete enforcement 
of the criminal code is chimerical.
146
  This is readily apparent with vice 
crimes.  Take narcotics distribution: at any given moment there are far more 
individuals engaged in narcotics distribution than law enforcement can 
possibly apprehend.  The facial homogeneity of “narcotics distribution” as 
codified
147
 is belied by the diversity of behaviors to which it applies.  It 
applies in equal measure to the suburbanite who sells cocaine out of his 
home for cash, the club-goer who gives ecstasy tabs to his friends in 
exchange for drinks, and the chronically homeless addict who sells crack on 
the street in kind.  Each of these examples, technically, constitutes the same 
criminal offense: narcotics distribution.  Legislatures, however, rarely 




Bloated criminal codes create a set of opportunities to indirectly 
address social problems, which are not criminalized per se.  These 
opportunities exist in three dimensions.  The surfeit of criminal laws allows 
police departments to arrest individuals (1) whose behavior is perceived as 
troublesome, but is not directly criminalized, e.g., in the 1990s, the NYPD 
aggressively used pedestrian and traffic obstruction laws against 
panhandlers, an activity that was not directly criminalized;
149
 (2) who are 
likely to engage in more serious criminalized behaviors in the future, e.g., 
avoiding the collateral, violent crimes associated with narcotics is often 




145 See GARLAND, supra note 81, at 132; see also TONRY, supra note 5, at 49 (discussing 
the racial disparities in arrest and incarceration rates, which are particularly pronounced for 
drug offenses). 
146 See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text. 
147 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 2000). 
148 See Stuntz, supra note 142, at 529–33 (describing incentives that lead legislators to 
define crimes broadly and leave it to police and prosecutors to exercise enforcement 
discretion).  Mandatory arrest laws in the domestic violence context are the rare exception.  
Weisburd & Eck, supra note 99, at 51. 
149 Tanya Erzen, Turnstile Jumpers and Broken Windows: Policing Disorder in New 
York City app, in ZERO TOLERANCE, supra note 140, at 19, 35–36 (quoting sections from the 
NYPD Quality of Life Enforcement Options Reference Guide); HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 
40, 102, 128 (2001) (recounting when New York City tried to criminalize panhandling, but 
the ordinance was deemed an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment). 
150 See Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 211; see also HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 
40, 102, 128 (expounding an analogous rationale for arresting aggressive panhandlers in 
New York City); Jim Dwyer, Whites Smoke Pot, but Blacks Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
23, 2009, at A24. 
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(3) who have likely engaged in serious criminal activity that cannot be 
readily proved, e.g., charging Al Capone with tax evasion.
151
 
Legislators have every incentive to leave it to prosecutors and police to 
liberally exercise their discretion not to enforce the criminal code.
152
  And 
courts are almost completely agnostic as to how they go about it.
153
  
Professor Stuntz has persuasively argued that it is full enforcement’s 
impossibility that enables relentless passage of new criminal laws.
154
  
Taking a hard-line stance on crime defines political orthodoxy for both the 
left and right in the United States.
155
  Passing a criminal law is the most 
visible way for legislators to substantiate their commitment to protecting 
the public, and the impossibility of full enforcement insulates legislators 
from the risk that new criminal laws will be politically unpalatable to large 
swaths of middle-class voters.
156
  According to Professor Stuntz, “criminal 
law” is no longer even law per se, but just a “veil” for the distribution of 
discretionary power to punish.
157
 
It is ironic that overcriminalization has amplified law enforcement’s 
discretionary authority because it is the public’s distrust of discretion that 
has animated the increasing sweep and severity of legislatures’ criminal 
enactments.  However, the most demonized forms of discretion have been 
those that the public imagines as introducing leniency into the system.
158
  




151 See Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2019–20 (describing the Boston Police Department’s use 
of narcotics laws to arrest gang members believed to have been responsible for substantial 
violent crime). 
152 See Stuntz, supra note 142, at 575–77. 
153 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (“[W]e are aware of no 
principle that would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive 
and so commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the 
lawfulness of enforcement.”). 
154 See Stuntz, supra note 142, at 575–77 (noting that strict federal sentencing guidelines 
emblematize hostility towards judicial discretion). 
155 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 79, at 59, 75, 102 (describing America’s increasing 
punitiveness as driving from the political left and right); Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2008–10 
(same).  Even liberal Democrats must declaim their commitment to aggressively expanding 
and enforcing criminal law.  SIMON, supra note 79, at 49–52, 58–59 (describing Presidents 
Kennedy’s, Johnson’s, and Clinton’s uses of crime as a political issue). 
156 Stuntz, supra note 142, at 528, 532–33.  Most legislators have no interest in 
compelling enforcement of those portions of the code criminalizing “marginal middle-class 
behavior.”  Id. at 509; see also id. at 516–17 (listing examples of statutes criminalizing 
trifling conduct). 
157 Id. at 599. 
158 SIMON, supra note 79, at 165.  Judicial discretion in sentencing is a prime example of 
this phenomenon.  See GARLAND, supra note 81, at 59–61. 
159 See GARLAND, supra note 81, at 132 (describing increased punitiveness); LaFave, 
supra note 18, at 215 (describing the invisibility of police discretion). 
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B. PROACTIVE POLICING CASE STUDIES 
Police departments enjoy considerable, unchecked authority to make 
policy as to how criminal laws are enforced.  Racial disparity in narcotics 
and quality-of-life enforcement illustrate how departmental discretion can 
generate inegalitarian consequences. 
The racial disparity in proactive policing arrests cannot, prima facie, be 
defended in terms of “colorblindness.”  Scholars acknowledge that 
proactive policing has driven racial disparity.
160
  Both proactive policing 
and reactive policing generate arrest disparity, but the latter is less troubling 
because victims play a substantial role in accounting for offenders’ 
demographic profile.
161
  In an ideal world, arrestee demographics would 
perfectly mirror offender demographics.  A racial group’s 
overrepresentation amongst offenders would perfectly account for its 
overrepresentation amongst arrestees.
162
  To the extent that crimes of 
violence are often intraracial,
163
 doing justice by minority victims should 
mean a higher arrest rate for minority suspects.
164
  Unfortunately, white 
crime victims inspire greater sympathy from individual police officers and 
police departments.
165
  All of this suggests that arrest disparity for victim-
reported crimes might even be higher without inspiring serious equality 
concerns.
166
  The same is not true in the proactive context. 
Arrest disparity in proactive policing is not readily explicable in terms 
of minority offense rates.
167
  The case studies that follow illustrate how 
 
160 TONRY, supra note 5, at 4, 6, 67 (arguing that differential arrest rate drives differential 
incarceration rate); Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 109; William J. Stuntz, The Political 
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 834–35 (2006). 
161 Colorblindness is a fair metaphor for describing the police’s enforcement priorities in 
the reactive context if: (1) individuals across demographic categories consistently alert the 
police to victimization and (2) the police consistently and symmetrically responded to 
victim-reported crimes.  Neither one of these is completely true.  There is a gap between 
reported crime and actual crime.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 134. 
162 This is a false ideal to the extent that entrenched patterns of economic and social 
marginalization engender violence and other criminal misconduct.  See, e.g., THE NAT’L 
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 28, at 266–74. 
163 See, e.g., ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BLACK VICTIMS OF 
VIOLENT CRIME 5 (2007). 
164 See Terrance J. Taylor et al., Racial Bias in Case Processing: Does Victim Race 
Affect Police Clearance of Violent Crime Incidents?, 26 JUST. Q. 562, 583 (2009) (noting the 
modestly lower violent-crime-clearance rate for black-on-black crime). 
165 See Smith et al., supra note 77, at 248; see also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, 
AND THE LAW 76–135 (1997) (detailing the history of unequal enforcement). 
166 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
53, 87 (2003) (arguing that equal protection should oblige police to provide equal security 
from law breakers). 
167 See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood 
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deployment decisions, enforcement priorities, and enforcement tactics yield 
dramatic racial disparity. 
1. Narcotics Enforcement 
Departmental decisions regarding geographic deployment, 
enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics have led the Seattle Police 
Department (SPD) to arrest an inordinately high number of black offenders.  
In particular, the SPD’s use of arrest-intensive, buy-bust operations in 
downtown Seattle targeting crack cocaine transactions yielded a black-
arrest rate that far exceeds black participation in unlawful narcotics 
transactions.  I focus on Seattle because there is more information about the 
demographic profile of offenders and police department decisionmaking 
there than for other cities.
168
 
Narcotics convictions in Seattle, like most other places in the United 
States, have accounted for a dramatic spike in the incarceration of poor 
people of color since the 1970s.
169
  Professor Tonry has argued that the 
racial disparity engendered by the war on drugs is the direct consequence of 
differential arrest rates.
170
  That is to say that police practices, not 
prosecutorial or judicial discrimination, tend to account for increases in 
minority incarceration.
171
  Police, who make arrests, determine the pool of 
offenders that generate indictments and convictions.  Typically, it is 
difficult to find quantitative proof for the claim that narcotics arrests yield 
unjustifiable racial disparity.  This is for two reasons: (1) it is difficult to 
construct a demographic profile of the offender population, because 
 
Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 323 
(2004); Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2022 (noting that it is politically easier to enforce laws 
against poor minority communities); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, 
Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 775, 812–14 (1999) (arguing that the social distinction between “law-abiding” 
and “lawless” is racialized). 
168 See generally Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the 
Question of Race: Lessons From Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419 (2005); Beckett et al., supra 
note 103; Klement & Siggins, supra note 85.  Information is available on narcotics 
enforcement practices in Seattle in part because of litigation challenging racial disparity and 
the SPD’s narcotics enforcement practices.  See State v. Johnson, No. 52123-3-I, 2005 WL 
353314 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2005).  I helped represent the defendants in that litigation 
for a brief period. 
169 See TONRY, supra note 5, at 4, 6, 112; Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 177–78, 
191 (noting minority overrepresentation amongst narcotics arrestees in 1999 and a 
proportional increase in drug arrests in comparison to total arrests throughout 1990s). 
170 TONRY, supra note 5, at 112–13. 
171 Id. at 51, 74; see also WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF 
RACE & ETHNICITY ON CHARGING AND SENTENCING PROCESSES FOR DRUG OFFENDERS IN 
THREE COUNTIES OF WASHINGTON STATE 43 (1999). 
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narcotics offenders are not likely to offer themselves up for demographers 
to count, and (2) there is little information on how and why police organize 
their enforcement priorities and tactics.
172
 
African-Americans are dramatically overrepresented amongst those 
arrested for narcotics offenses in Seattle.  From January 1999 until April 
2001, 64.2% of those arrested for narcotics delivery in Seattle were 
African-American.
173
  During that period, African-Americans constituted 
only 8.4% of Seattle’s population and were also a minority amongst 
Seattle’s drug users and sellers.
174
  Public health data, in conjunction with 
ethnographic and survey data, tends to suggest that drug sellers are white in 
roughly the same proportion as drug users in Seattle.
175
  Seattle’s drug-
using and drug-selling populations are significantly whiter than in most 
other American cities.
176
  This is unsurprising given that Seattle’s general 
population is more white than most other American cities.
177
  Seattle also is 
reputed for its heroin problem, and the demographic profile of heroin users 
in Seattle is overwhelmingly white.
178
  The same is, by and large, true for 
other narcotics.
179
  African-Americans are, however, overrepresented  
among crack users and sellers,
180
 but whites still represent approximately 
half of all crack users in Seattle.
181
  This is to say that the demographic 
profile of drug users in Seattle is largely white.  The same holds true for 
drug sellers.
182
  This is consistent with national trends and crack’s appeal to 
poor people.
183
  There is little to suggest that crack use represents a 
 
172 See TONRY, supra note 5, at 107 (noting that evidence regarding policing practices 
tends to be anecdotal). 
173 Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 118 (reporting on data collected for 
methamphetamine, heroin, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and ecstasy because these drugs 
are treated comparably for punishment purposes).  African-Americans are comparably 
overrepresented amongst those arrested for drug possession.  See Beckett et al., supra note 
168, at 427. 
174 Id. at 426. 
175 Compare Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 119, with Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 
427. 
176 Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 424, 427. 
177 Id. (stating that 70.1% of Seattle residents are white). 
178 Id. at 424, 426. 
179 Id. at 427. 
180 See Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 119. 
181 Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 427. 
182 This is not to say that “drug sellers” and “drug buyers” are separate and discrete 
communities. 
183 On average, Seattle’s blacks are significantly poorer than its whites.  See Office of the 
Exec., Per Capita Income in King County by Race/Ethnicity, As a Percent of County 
Average (2009), KING COUNTY (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.kingcounty.gov/
exec/PSB/BenchmarkProgram/Economy/EC02_Income/PerCapitaIncomeRaceChart.aspx 
(reporting that per capita income of the county’s white residents is more than twice that of its 
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particularly serious public safety problem in Seattle in relation to other 
narcotics, particularly heroin.
184
  Nonetheless, the Seattle Police Department 
focuses its enforcement energies on crack transactions, and that focus, in 
turn, drives the stark racial disparity in its arrest rates. 
Institutional discretion substantially accounts for the arrest disparity 
described above.  At least one trial-court judge found that the most relevant 
decisionmakers were at the institutional level.
185
  Professor Beckett’s work 
also suggests that institutional-level decisionmaking drives racial disparity 
in narcotics arrests in Seattle. 
The SPD opted for an arrest-intensive narcotics enforcement strategy 
that relied upon specialized undercover units.  As is true for many big-city 
police departments, patrol does not generate high numbers of arrests (for 
any sort of offense) per officer in Seattle.
186
  Specialized narcotics units, on 
the other hand, generate high numbers of arrests per officer; this is 
particularly true of units that focus on street-level narcotics transactions.  
These units typically focus on “retail” transactions, where other specialized 
units, often called “Narcotics” or something similar, tend to focus on larger 
distributors further up the supply chain.
187
 
For those officers assigned to work street-level details, making arrests 
is, quite literally, their daily work.
188
  In the SPD, “Anti-Crime Teams” 
focus on street-level narcotics enforcement,
189
 and “buy-bust” is among 
their staple tactics.
190
  In a buy-bust, an undercover officer purchases a 
small quantity of narcotics using marked currency.  Upon completing the 
transaction, the undercover officer alerts the “arrest team” with a 
prearranged signal.  The arrest team then proceeds to arrest the seller and 
any individuals who might have helped facilitate the transaction.  Although 
effective at generating arrests, buy-bust operations are labor-intensive.  A 
 
black residents). 
184 Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 434. 
185 See State v. Johnson, No. 52123-3-I, 2005 WL 353314, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 
14, 2005) (affirming the trial court’s determination that relevant decisionmakers could be in 
central command). 
186 See Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 195.  To the extent that patrol generates 
substantial numbers of arrests, it is typically because so many officers are dedicated to such 
units.  Patrol typically generates traffic-related arrests (whether for traffic-related offenses, 
narcotics, or other contraband), but making arrests is a small fraction of what the unit (and 
individual officers in the unit) do.  See id. 
187 See id. at 192–94. 
188 See CONLON, supra note 84, at 157–58 (describing the NYPD). 
189 See Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 195. 
190 See Troy Duster, Pattern, Purpose, and Race in the Drug War: The Crisis of 
Credibility in Criminal Justice, in CRACK IN AMERICA 260, 265 (Craig Reinarman & Harry 
G. Levine eds., 1997) (noting prevalence of buy-bust operations in various American cities). 
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buy-bust in Seattle often involves upwards of ten officers and generates six 
to ten arrests.
191
  The capacity for any precinct to regularly carry out buy-
busts depends on whether it has sufficient officer resources to do so and 
what the enforcement mandate for the particular precinct happens to be.
192
 
Historically, the SPD has used undercover buy-bust operations most 
heavily in the downtown precinct where African-American narcotics sellers 
are concentrated.
193
  The vast majority of narcotics arrests made in Seattle 
occur downtown.
194
  The Anti-Crime Teams in the downtown precinct are 
afforded the resources and charged with doing narcotics enforcement.
195
  
Although there is considerable outdoor narcotics activity in downtown 
Seattle, there is also considerable outdoor activity in other parts of the city, 
not to mention indoor activity.
196
  There are, however, significantly more 
African-American participants in outdoor drug transactions in downtown 
Seattle than in other parts of the city.
197
  SPD’s focus on making outdoor 
arrests downtown generates the stark racial disparity in narcotics arrests.  
But use of arrest-intensive specialization and geographic concentration do 
not entirely account for the disparity. 
The SPD appears to target its enforcement effort on crack transactions 
as opposed to other comparable narcotics.
198
  This is particularly surprising 
given the prevalence of heroin and Seattle’s reputation for being a “heroin 
city.”
199
  The SPD’s narcotics enforcement tactics directed at both indoor 
and outdoor narcotics transactions inordinately target crack.
200
  In fact, 
Professor Beckett estimates that nearly 50% of all indoor enforcement 
 
191 See Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 198. 
192 See id. 
193 See Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 45 (noting that 65% of buy-busts were 
concentrated in three downtown census tracts); Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 196 
(noting that fewer buy-bust operations occur in the southern suburban areas). 
194 See Klement & Siggins, supra note 85, at 197–98 (noting that 54% of all narcotics 
arrests were made in the West Precinct, which includes downtown). 
195 See id. at 198. 
196 See Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 122–23.  Indoor enforcement, although more 
time-consuming in absolute terms because of the warrant requirement, tends to be more 
“productive” when measured in terms of arrests and contraband seized per officer hour.  Id. 
at 121. 
197 Id. 
198 See id. at 123 (arguing that the focus on crack drives disparity); Beckett et al., supra 
note 168, at 435. 
199 See Vanessa Ho, Drug Is Infiltrating All Walks of Seattle Life, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 13, 2000, at A1. 
200 Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 123, 125.  Beckett’s analysis suggests that individual 
officer discretion also plays a role in targeting crack.  Her study revealed that some 
individual officers tend to ask for crack when carrying out a buy-bust.  See Beckett et al., 
supra note 168, at 429. 
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operations in Seattle are for crack-related transactions.
201
  And, this far 




The SPD has offered some justifications for the racial disparity in 
narcotics arrest rates.  Those justifications focus on the uniqueness of the 
downtown precinct, the heightened dangers created by outdoor narcotics 
transactions, and the administrative difficulties of carrying out indoor 
narcotics enforcement.
203
  None of these justifications completely explains 
Professor Beckett’s conclusions.  Even if they did, it would only beg the 
question of whether the SPD was fairly balancing competing goals, by 
asking whether the department’s choices to focus on crack, prioritize 
outdoor transactions downtown, and use arrests (as opposed to other 
deterrence-based tactics) sensibly promote security, public health, or some 
other community benefit.  That sort of balancing is not for any particular 
officer to carry out.  It is squarely within the department’s discretionary 
ambit. 
2. Quality-of-Life Policing 
Quality-of-life policing sounds euphemistic when considered from the 
vantage of the countless minority arrestees against whom it has been 
directed.  Such policing places a high premium on arresting individuals 
because of their contribution to “disorder” rather than violating any law per 
se.
204
  Again, the three incidents of institutional discretion—geographic 
deployment, enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics—substantially 
account for arrest disparity. 
Quality-of-life or “order-maintenance” policing has its theoretical 
mooring in James Wilson and George Kelling’s now-iconic “broken 
windows” argument.
205
  Numerous scholars have described it, so only a 
brief summary is needed here.
206
  Wilson and Kelling argued that the 
dominant crime-control strategies of the late twentieth century failed, not 
only on their own terms, but more generally in making “citizens” feel more 
secure.
207
  Instead of focusing on isolated instances of crime, the broken 
 
201 Beckett et al., supra note 103, at 125. 
202 Id. (estimating that 25% of total drug transactions are for crack). 
203 See State v. Johnson, No. 52123-3-I, 2005 WL 353314, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 
14, 2005). 
204 See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 128. 
205 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 
1982, at 29. 
206 See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 128. 
207 KELLING & COLES, supra note 26, at 70–71.  The broken windows theory is not 
necessarily built upon an inclusive conceptualization of citizenship.  For a discussion of how 
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windows theory suggests that law enforcement should minimize “low-level 
disorder.”
208
  Panhandling, graffiti, vandalized buildings, street prostitution, 
low-level narcotics transactions, squeegeeing, and the like engender public 
fear.
209
  Disorder engenders fear, withdrawal from public space, and serious 
crime.
210
  Urban anonymity fuels disorder and is, in turn, fueled by disorder: 
if left unchecked, the feedback loop yields an ever-accelerating descent into 
criminogenic pathology.
211
  Normatively, the broken windows theory 
supports the diversion of police resources from 911 call-and-response and 
incident-driven crime solving to “order maintenance,” i.e., the containment 
and elimination of “low-level disorder.”
212
  The broken windows theory 
counsels in favor of directing resources towards proactive policing, in 
which institutional discretion has the greatest sway in determining arrestee 
demographics.
213
  In its theoretical formulation, however, the broken 
windows hypothesis does not necessarily counsel in favor of making more 
arrests.
214
  Rather, it stresses the importance of deterring disorder by 
increasing the police’s visible presence in a neighborhood through 
increased patrols, greater police–citizen contact, and remedying the signs of 
disorder.
215
  Both Kelling and Wilson candidly acknowledge that the 




The most notable implementation of order-maintenance policing was 
in New York City in the 1990s.  Contrary to the theory, however, the 
NYPD opted for an arrest-intensive version of order-maintenance policing 
dubbed “zero tolerance.”
217
  During the 1990s, the NYPD dramatically 
 
broken windows assumes and reproduces relations of class dominance, see HARCOURT, 
supra note 79, at 215–16 (quoting KELLING & COLES, supra note 26).  That an individual’s 
feelings of “security” should be a priority for law enforcement represents a recent innovation 
in policing theory and one that also assumes and reproduces relations of class dominance.  
See GARLAND, supra note 81, at 152–54. 
208 KELLING & COLES, supra note 26, at 15. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 15–16, 20, 242. 
211 Id. at 20.  The relationships between “disorder” and fear or insecurity were based 
exclusively on the authors’ limited observations and informed conjecture.  See, e.g., id. at 
26–27, 236–37. 
212 Id. at 15. 
213 See WILSON, supra note 12, at 86, 100. 
214 KELLING & COLES, supra note 26, at 23, 84. 
215 Id. at 19. 
216 Id. at 170; cf. WILSON, supra note 12, at 100 (noting the extent to which institutional 
discretion shapes vice enforcement). 
217 See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 101; Wynn, supra note 140, at 107.  The proponents 
of the broken windows theory hardly seemed upset with the arrest-intensive interpretation of 
their theory.  See KELLING & COLES, supra note 26, at 158–70 (praising NYPD’s order-
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increased the number of misdemeanor arrests in what was billed as an effort 
to “retake” New York City’s public spaces for law-abiding citizens.
218
  
Although much-touted for reducing crime in New York City,
219
 quantitative 
evidence suggests that factors other than quality-of-life policing account for 
the drop.
220
  What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of arrestees 
were minorities.
221
  The police assessment was, of course, that arrestee 
demographics mirror offender demographics.
222
  Analyzing how 
institutional discretion operates in this context goes a long way in 
undermining that claim. 
i. New York City 
Upon taking office, Mayor Giuliani and Police Commissioner William 
Bratton consciously adopted the broken window theory’s core premise: 
proactively enforcing against minor crimes decreases more serious crimes 
and makes communities feel more secure.
223
  The NYPD has elected to 
enforce against minor crimes using arrest-intensive tactics. 
The mayor and police commissioner used the expressions “quality-of 
life-policing,” “zero tolerance,” and “order maintenance” 
interchangeably.
224
  Both also believed that aggressively and proactively 
enforcing against minor crimes would forestall more serious crimes later 
and create greater “order.”  New York City’s criminal code, like most 
others, was replete with crimes that typically went unenforced.  The Bratton 
NYPD sought to enforce many of these laws both to interdict the specific 
behavior criminalized and to contain “disorderly” persons not otherwise 
engaging in criminalized conduct.
225
  The NYPD explicitly prioritized 
enforcement against low-level narcotics offenses in public, prostitution, 
graffiti, public intoxication, public urination, and a host of pedestrian and 
 
maintenance policing strategy). 
218 See WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND 228 (1998); HARCOURT, 
supra note 79, at 10 (noting misdemeanor arrests jumped 50% between 1993 and 1996 
despite a constant complaint rate). 
219 See, e.g., BRATTON, supra note 218, at 259, 280, 289; Eli B. Silverman, Crime in New 
York: A Success Story, PUB. PERSP., June-July 1997, at 3. 
220 See, e.g., Bernard Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from 
New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 277 (2006). 
221 Andrew Golub et al., Does Quality-of-Life Policing Widen the Net? 11 (Aug. 13, 
2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
198996.pdf. 
222 See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 174 (quoting Commissioner Safir). 
223 See id. 185–86 (quoting Giuliani); BRATTON, supra note 218, at 138, 152, 179. 
224 See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 50. 
225 See Erzen, supra note 149, at 35–36; HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 101–02. 
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traffic violations.
226
  Aggressive enforcement against such minor crimes 
was explicitly premised upon the expectation of discovering crimes 
unrelated to the reason for arrest or, alternatively, preempting commission 
of more serious criminal acts later.  For example, the man arrested for 
turnstile jumping sometimes turned out to have an outstanding warrant for 
failing to appear in court or the man arrested for drinking beer in public 
sometimes turned out to possess an unregistered firearm.
227
 
Departmental decisionmakers in no uncertain terms communicated to 
line officers that they were to use their arrest power to effect the 
department’s quality-of-life agenda.  Many officers understood this 
mandate to mean arrest first, ask questions later.
228
  Departmental 
decisionmakers, however, did more than just communicate the importance 
of enforcing against minor crimes.  Rather, the NYPD’s order-maintenance 
program embraced an incapacitation scheme that sought to take the 
“disorderly” off the streets altogether.  As discussed below, the designation 
“disorderly” is far from objective, particularly given the extent to which 
race and class shape perceptions of disorder.
229
  Towards that end, the 
department privileged high arrest rates as the rubric of success and tailored 
geographic deployment and used specialized units accordingly. 
To execute its order-maintenance scheme, the NYPD relied upon 
arrest-intensive, specialized units and created new incentives for patrol 
officers to make more arrests.
230
  Targeting low-level narcotics transactions 
in public spaces was a high priority for the NYPD under Bratton.  The 
department increased its spending on arrest-intensive narcotics units.
231
  
The department also increased the number of officers and times of day that 
the specialized units engaged in undercover operations such as buy-bust 
operations.
232
  Later in the 1990s, under Commissioner Howard Safir, the 
department increased the number of officers in specialized street-crimes 
units with a principal mandate of weapons interdiction.
233
  The street-crimes 
units made aggressive use of stop-and-frisk tactics in their efforts.  The 
tactics were controversial because of the impact on innocent minority 
 
226 BRATTON, supra note 218, at 227–29. 
227 See id. at 168, 214, 229. 
228 See Wynn, supra note 140, at 109–11. 
229 See Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 167, at 323. 
230 See Wynn, supra note 140, at 111 (citing George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, 
Declining Crime Rates: Insiders’ Views of the New York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1217 (1998)). 
231 See BRATTON, supra note 218, at 227–28. 
232 Id.; see supra notes 186–197 and accompanying text (discussing racial disparity 
generated by Seattle Police Department’s reliance on buy-bust operations). 
233 See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 50. 
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pedestrians.
234
  The arrestee demographic deserves as much scrutiny.  The 
focus on low-level marijuana arrests has continued to the present day.
235
  
The NYPD arrested a record 40,300 individuals in 2008 for misdemeanor 
marijuana offenses.
236
  The vast majority of these arrestees were minorities, 
and specialized undercover narcotics units made nearly half of the arrests.
237
  
The NYPD’s reliance on arrest-intensive specialized units was not simply 
limited to guns and narcotics.
238
  Undercover street-crimes units were 
directed to arrest individuals for a host of quality-of-life crimes.  Among the 
more notable examples was the apprehension of turnstile jumpers.
239
 
Under its zero-tolerance mandate, the NYPD converted patrol into a 
more arrest-intensive unit than is typically true.
240
  The department 
accomplished this by requiring patrol officers to arrest where they had 
previously issued citations and by using officer’s arrest figures as a measure 
of occupational success.  Many of the misdemeanors that were at the heart 
of New York City’s order-maintenance scheme had erstwhile been offenses 
for which officers, in their discretion, issued citations or simply ignored.
241
  
This was true for various “public nuisances” such as drinking, public 
urination, panhandling, prostitution, and smoking marijuana.
242
  The zero-
tolerance mandate for such disorderly persons was to take them off the 
street.  Patrol officers were no longer to be lenient upon encountering such 
persons.  Not only did the department instruct patrol officers to make more 
arrests,
243
 but management was supposed to monitor arrest numbers 
generated by individual patrol officers.
244
  At least some patrol officers 
 
234 See generally ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP AND 
FRISK” PRACTICES (1999) (discussing disparate impact of the NYPD’s stop and frisk 
practices on minorities). 
235 See Dwyer, supra note 150. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Some have argued that the NYPD’s aggressive stop-and-frisk policing played a 
significant role in reducing New York City’s homicide rate in the mid-1990s.  See, e.g., 
Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 
43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 326–28 (2010) (extrapolating from studies of intensive patrol in 
specific, high-crime locations). 
239 See SILVERMAN, supra note 114, at 3. 
240 BRATTON, supra note 218, at 227; see also Wynn, supra note 140, at 111 (citing 
Kelling & Bratton, supra note 230); Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of 
Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 175 (1999) (citing 
BRATTON, supra note 218, at 227). 
241 BRATTON, supra note 218, at xv, 153, 155, 229. 
242 Id. at 228–29; Andrew Golub et al., The Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor 
Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 131, 131 (2007). 
243 See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 140, at 18. 
244 See WYNN, supra note 140, at 112. 
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understood this to mean that they should arrest whenever encountering a 
“disorderly” person.
245
  Unsurprisingly, the effects of the new arrest-
intensive approach were not evenly distributed across the city. 
To understand why misdemeanor narcotics arrestees were inordinately 
minorities, the NYPD’s enforcement priorities and use of arrests must be 
understood in conjunction with geographic deployment decisions.
246
  There 
is mixed evidence on whether, given an opportunity, any particular 
individual NYPD officer would elect to arrest a minority offender over a 
white one.
247
  But, as discussed, patterns of residential segregation make 
individual officer discretion less of a factor than institutional discretion in 
accounting for arrestee demographics.  New York City is no exception.  
There have been multiple studies focusing on misdemeanor marijuana-
possession arrests, a hallmark of zero-tolerance policing.
248
  The studies 
conclude that, from the late 1990s onward, the NYPD has targeted poor 
minority communities for misdemeanor arrests.
249
  Although no one has 
undertaken a comprehensive study of the geographic distribution of quality-
of-life arrests in New York City, the number of minorities involved in 
marijuana arrests suggests that the NYPD directed arrest-intensive policing 
at minorities. 
The spatial logic of zero-tolerance policing in New York City revolved 
around the twin axes of high crime and disorder.  The two were often 
elided, but the former was identified through quantitative measures while 
the latter was not.  Under Bratton, the NYPD began using Compstat, a 
computerized tool for tracking crime reports and arrests.
250
  Because 
Compstat only accounts for reported crime, it did not necessarily create a 
 
245 See id. at 118–19. 
246 HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 10 (discussing misdemeanor arrests in New York City).  
Researchers have found that the demographic profile of those arrested for quality-of-life type 
offenses is similar to that of those arrested for more serious offenses.  In both cases the 
profile is largely minority.  Quality-of-life policing, thus, did not shift the demographic 
profile of arrestees.  It increased the number of misdemeanors arrestees across the board.  
See Golub et al., supra note 221, at 15. 
247 See Fagan et al., supra note 55, at 820 (noting that officers are more likely to arrest a 
white individual than an individual of a minority once stop has been effected). 
248 See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 140; Golub et. al., supra note 242; Andrew Golub et 
al., Smoking Marijuana in Public: The Spatial and Policy Shift in New York City Arrests 
1992-2003, 3 HARM REDUCTION J. no. 22, Aug. 4, 2006, available at 
http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/pdf/1477-7517-3-22.pdf. 
249 See Golub et. al., supra note 248, at 23.  The study notes, however, that in the early 
1990s, the NYPD focused its enforcement efforts in lower Manhattan.  The demographic 
profile of arrestees was nonetheless overwhelmingly minority, suggesting an inordinately 
minority offender population or racial bias (whether implicit or explicit) on the part of 
individual officers.  See id. at 9, 23. 
250 See BRATTON, supra note 218, at 233–39. 
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portrait of low-level crimes that are at the core of the broken windows 
theory.
251
  Nonetheless, because the broken window theory posits a direct 
relationship between quality-of-life crimes and more serious crimes, the 
department targeted “high crime” areas—low income, minority 
neighborhoods tend to have higher rates of reported crime than other 
neighborhoods—for zero-tolerance policing.
252
  This targeting was based on 
the assumption that incapacitating low-level offenders would have 
ameliorative effects on serious crime, even if particular reported incidents 
of serious crime went unsolved. 
Even more troubling is the extent to which generic notions of disorder 
animated zero-tolerance policing.  The authors of the broken windows 
theory suggest a highly impressionistic understanding of disorder.  Their 
conception is shot through with middle-class assumptions of what urban 
decay looks like.
253
  While the theory of order maintenance assumes that 
“disorder” can be objectively distinguished from “order,”
254
 both are deeply 
subjective.
255
  Based on survey data, Sampson and Raudenbush have 
concluded that the racial and economic makeup of a neighborhood go much 
further in predicting observers’ perceptions of disorder than does any 
objective standard of disorder.
256
  One’s ability to recognize disorder is a 
product of cultural cognition and, accordingly, structured by race and class 
affinities—affinities that one might not consciously espouse.
257
  There is 
limited, anecdotal evidence to suggest that the NYPD, like other police 




ii. Chicago’s Anti-Gang Ordinance 
Although Chicago did not embrace as comprehensive a zero-tolerance 
policing program as New York City did, it did target gangs with an anti-





251 Compstat also creates incentives for police to underreport crimes.  See Rayman, supra 
note 105. 
252 See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 140, at 48 (noting and criticizing NYPD’s claim that 
low-level marijuana enforcement reduces more serious crime). 
253 See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 215–16 (quoting Wilson & Kelling, supra note 
205). 
254 See id. at 132–34. 
255 See generally Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 167 (discussing the connection 
between perception and disorder). 
256 See id. at 323. 
257 See id. at 320. 
258 See id. 
259 See HARCOURT, supra note 79, at 1–3. 
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The ordinance, enacted in 1992, became the subject of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Chicago v. Morales.
260
  The ordinance empowered the 
police to order known gang members found “loitering in any public place 
with one or more other persons” to disperse.
261
  The city council assumed 
that there was a causal relationship between loitering and more serious 
crimes.
262
  It further empowered the police to arrest anyone failing to obey 
the dispersal command.
263
  Before it was finally held unconstitutional, the 
police arrested 42,000 persons for violating the ordinance.
264
  The Supreme 
Court struck the ordinance down on due process grounds, explaining that 
the generic prohibition of “loitering” encompasses much “innocent 
conduct” and thus leaves “lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment 
of the policeman on his beat.”
265
  
The Chicago gang ordinance highlights institutional discretion’s 
relationship with racial disparity in arrest rates.  The department’s role in 
making deployment decisions likely had significantly more to do with the 
demographic profile of arrestees than did any individual officer’s exercise 
of discretion.  A departmental general order directed district commanders to 
designate those areas, frequented by gang members, in which the ordinance 
would be enforced.
266
  In Morales, the Court rejected Chicago’s argument 
that the police department’s general order sufficiently limited individual 
officer discretion.
267
  The Court may have been right to reject the argument 
as a technical matter, but the notion that simply replacing the word 
“loitering” in the ordinance with more specific words would prevent 
arbitrary or racially skewed enforcement is implausible.  Even without the 
ordinance, there were already numerous laws on the books that permitted 
similar kinds of order-maintenance policing.
268
  Changing the statute’s 
wording essentially solved the vagueness problem.  Fine-grained lexical 
distinctions in law tend not to have significant impact on an individual 
 
260 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
261 Id. at 41. 
262 City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. 1997) (quoting ordinance 
preamble).  Before the Supreme Court, Chicago argued that the ordinance actually prevented 
a substantial number of more serious crimes.  See Morales, 527 U.S. at 48.  Subsequent 
research, however, calls this conclusion into question.  See HARCOURT, supra note 79, 104–
06 (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer & Albert W. Alschuler, Getting the Facts Straight: Crime 
Trends, Community Support, and the Police Enforcement of ‘Social Norms,’ LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. (2000)). 
263 Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 58. 
264 Morales, 527 U.S. at 49 (relying on the City of Chicago’s brief). 
265 Id. at 60 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 (1983)). 
266 Id. at 48. 
267 Id. at 62. 
268 Id. at 52. 
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officer’s decisionmaking in the field.
269
  However, personnel policies and 
orders from senior command do, particularly in the proactive policing 
context.
270
  To the extent that the Chicago Police Department directs 
officers to go to particular areas and make arrests, individual officers will 
do so.  And to the extent that the individuals loitering on the street are all 
young men of color, it is inevitable that the arrestees will be as well.  The 
decisive moments of discretionary decisionmaking will have occurred 
before the arresting officers even leave the precinct station. 
Morales, like criminal procedure generally, tells us virtually nothing 
about how to understand the relationship between departmental discretion 
and race, let alone how that relationship ought to be calibrated to serve 
democratic principles.   
IV. POLICING POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
Distributive justice theory suggests a much more active role for courts 
and prosecutors in regulating the three dimensions of departmental 
discretion identified in Part III.  In proactive policing, police departments 
have considerable discretion to ration arrests as they see fit.  These 
departmental choices generate winners and losers, with significant 
distributive consequences.  This Section argues that the law should treat 
proactive policing arrests as distributive goods.  It follows that departmental 
discretion should be regulated to control for inegalitarian consequences. 
A. ARREST AS A DISTRIBUTIVE PHENOMENON 
Distributive justice is concerned with how democratic institutions in a 
community of autonomous individuals should ensure equal distributions of 
rights, resources, and obligations.
271
  This Subsection will show that arrest 
 
269 See, e.g., Stephen D. Mastrofski, Organizational Determinants of Police Discretion: 
The Case of Drinking-Driving, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. 387, 394 (1987) (arguing that the existence 
of criminal law is only one factor in explaining officer decisionmaking); Meghan Stroshine, 
The Influence of “Working Rules” on Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making, 
11 POLICE Q. 315, 320 (2008) (noting that police rely on “rules of thumb” rather than legal 
specifics). 
270 See WILSON, supra note 12, at 49. 
271 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 3–4 (1980); JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3–6 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999) (1971); see also 
Samuel Scheffler, The Morality of Criminal Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 965, 966 (2000) (noting 
that distributive justice is preoccupied with institutionally defined entitlements and presumes 
no desert preceding such).  Rawls and Ackerman represent contemporary examples of the 
social-contract tradition, which presupposes that self-possessed individuals can make 
agreements.  For a discussion of the implicit identity assumptions upon which such theory 
depends, see Nirej S. Sekhon, Equality & Identity Hierarchy, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 349, 
364–70 (2008). 
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policy can implicate all three.  Arrest policy can impinge upon the right to 
be free of discrimination, limit economic and social opportunities, and 
differentially enforce the obligation to abide by the law.  Part III showed 
that arrest is not the inevitable consequence of law-breaking; this is most 
acutely true in the proactive policing context.  There, enforcement 
opportunities far exceed enforcement resources and departments have 
substantial discretion to selectively apply those resources.  Because this is 
true, evaluating whether a police department employs its arrest discretion 
justly is not reducible to the question of whether each individual arrest is 
carried out lawfully.  In contrast to the dominant theories of criminal 
punishment, distributive justice focuses on whether institutional policies 
spread costs and benefits across a heterogeneous citizenry in an egalitarian 
manner.  I argue that arrest distribution will be egalitarian when it is in 
keeping with what the relevant political community would have authorized 
had its members:  (1) possessed accurate information regarding the 
prevalence and distribution of criminal misconduct, and (2) been willing to 
absorb the range of costs associated with arrests in proportion to actual law-
breaking in their immediate social orbit—members of the relevant 
community would make choices expecting enforcement intensity to impact 
their family members, neighbors, colleagues, etc., in strict proportion to the 
actual law-breaking that occurs amongst those individuals. 
Dominant theories of the criminal sanction offer little guidance on 
whether or how egalitarian principles should structure criminal law 
enforcement.  By “dominant,” I mean utilitarian, retributive, and 
expressivist theories.
272
  It is beyond this paper’s scope to offer more than a 
cursory account of each.  Expressivism and retribution justify criminal 
enforcement by reference to a community’s moral norms, i.e., criminal 
sanction is the social expression of moral condemnation.
273
  Retributive 
theories typically assume Kantian notions of moral agency and 
responsibility—the criminal sanction ought to be imposed in accordance 
with an individual’s moral desert.
274
  Expressivist theories, on the other 
hand, view condemnation as a means for communities to reaffirm their own 
foundational, moral tenets.
275
  Morally anchored conceptualizations of the 
criminal sanction suggest that the police ought to pursue offenders in order 
 
272 See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET. AL., CRIMINAL LAW CASES & MATERIALS 31–71 (6th ed. 
2008). 
273 See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING & 
DESERVING 95, 99–100 (1970) (citing Henry Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 408 (1958)). 
274 See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. R. 3, 5 (1955). 
275 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 273, at 115 (arguing that punishment is a ritualized 
disavowal of the offending act). 
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of moral depravity.  Only at the highest level of generality is it true that 
police departments actually do this; for example, most police departments 
would prioritize homicide investigations over petty theft investigations.  
That said, within the context of proactive policing, there is little to suggest 
that police departments are able to rank priorities according to moral 
exigency.  It is unsurprising that moral exigency is an unwieldy mechanism 
for allocating scarce resources.  In a pluralistic society, moral questions are 
the source of contentious disagreement.
276
  For petty narcotics, quality-of-
life, and other minor crimes, offenders’ moral depravity affords limited 
justification for imposition of the criminal sanction at all, let alone 
providing a guide for allocating scarce enforcement resources between 
different target groups. 
At first glance, utilitarian theories seem more promising for regulating 
police discretion because they are explicitly concerned with costs and 
benefits.  Utilitarianism, however, is largely concerned with maximizing the 
latter and minimizing the former without regard for how either is distributed 
across members of a community.  Utilitarianism is not preoccupied with 
whether any particular distribution is, in and of itself, equitable.  Even when 
concerned with policing’s negative effects upon disadvantaged populations, 
utilitarian approaches instrumentalize those effects, casting them in terms of 
optimal deterrence.  For example, some have argued that overly aggressive 
policing undermines the police’s legitimacy in poor neighborhoods and, 
consequently, erodes residents’ commitment to abiding by the law and 
cooperating with the police.
277
  The most salient concern here is preventing 
law-breaking in poor communities.
278
  Distributive concerns are not 
important in and of themselves, but only to the extent that they consolidate 
law enforcement’s legitimacy and, correspondingly, poor communities’ 
willingness to cooperate with law enforcement.  Put more generally, a 
utilitarian approach to policing will counsel in favor of enforcing against 
those offenders where deterrence is obtained most efficiently.  Such an 
approach need not target those offenses or offenders that impose the 
greatest costs upon the relevant community.  Utilitarianism, however, does 
overlap with distributive justice to the extent that both direct institutions to 
take a broad and thorough account of policies’ costs and benefits.  
Distributive justice, however, seeks to ensure an egalitarian distribution of 
both costs and benefits as an end, in and of itself. 
 
276 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
433, 477 (1999) (discussing how political dialogue around expressive values is contentious). 
277 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of 
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 286 (2003). 
278 See, e.g., Meares, supra note 35, at 681–82 (arguing that a lack of well-entrenched 
norms in poor communities accounts for failure to comply with law). 
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While criminal procedure scholars have noted that policing has a 
redistributive dimension,
279
 no one has systematically analyzed policing 
through the lens of distributive justice.
280
  Professor Stuntz, for example, 
has noted that policing is redistributive because the most intensive policing 
does not occur in those neighborhoods that foot most of the tax bill.
281
  
Professor Sklansky has suggested that policing should promote 
egalitarianism.
282
  Neither, however, specifically addresses what distributive 
justice theory might require of police departments.
283
 
Both utilitarianism and distributive justice require identification of 
proactive policing’s costs and benefits.  As shorthand, one might think of 
security as policing’s primary benefit.
284
  On the other side of the scale, 
policing imposes obvious costs on taxpayers and the individuals who are 
arrested.
285
  The analysis of costs, however, should not end there.  Policing 
generates a host of additional, less-obvious costs that recent scholarship has 
identified.  Those costs include arrests’ long-term consequences upon 
arrestees’ earning and productive capacities, the collateral consequences 
upon arrestees’ families and communities, and the consequences upon 
crime control itself.
286
  Scholars have persuasively argued that focusing law 
 
279 See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 
1821 (2005); Stuntz, supra note 160, at 823, 832. 
280 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 160, at 832.  By the same token, distributive justice 
theorists have not focused on criminal justice.  For example, Bruce Ackerman devotes only a 
handful of pages to criminal law, see ACKERMAN, supra note 271, at 83–88, while John 
Rawls devotes none at all, see RAWLS, supra note 271.  One notable exception is Sharon 
Dolovich’s extrapolation from Rawls.  Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal 
Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307 (2004).  Dolovich attempts to make up for Rawls’s 
silence on criminal justice by identifying the foundational agreements that a modified 
Rawlsian “original position” would have generated regarding criminal justice.  Id. at 326–28.  
Dolovich does not speak to arrest policy specifically, but does identify abstract principles 
governing punishment.  See id. at 408–09. 
281 See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2149 
(2002). 
282 See Sklansky, supra note 279, at 1821–22 (discussing how privatization of police 
functions threatens egalitarianism). 
283 See id.; see also Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 323, 326 (2004) (arguing for greater use of cost-benefit analysis in criminal law); 
Stuntz, supra note 280, at 823 (noting that police undertake cost-benefit analysis when 
deciding where to devote proactive policing resources). 
284 By “security” I mean some objective measure of harm prevention, not simply the 
amelioration of individuals’ subjective fear.  The latter tends to be exaggerated and 
racialized in ways that drive some of the institutional dynamics described in this Article.  
See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 79, at 75–76. 
285 See Stuntz, supra note 281, at 2164–66. 
286 See Brown, supra note 283, at 345–48 (summarizing research on costs of criminal 
law enforcement). 
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enforcement upon specific groups may actually increase crime rates.
287
  
That police departments consistently get the cost-benefit balance 
egregiously wrong, particularly within minority neighborhoods,
288
 is likely 
because police overlook the less obvious, less easily quantified costs of 
what they do.  Quantifying these costs presents a challenge to any utilitarian 
approach, but particularly those that suggest technocratic regulation of the 
police, i.e., an approach which assumes that a bureaucratic regulator can 
weigh costs and benefits with some empirical certainty.
289
  The problem is 
that many of the “costs” and “benefits” at play in policing require value 
judgments about competing priorities.  Such costs and benefits, by 
definition, resist quantification, presenting themselves as incommensurate.  
That is to say that utilitarian approaches may call for the impossible task of 
balancing what are essentially expressivist commitments.
290
  For example, 
consider how an administrative rulemaker would balance the costs and 
benefits of arresting juvenile taggers.  What if some of the taggers produce 
murals that many residents actually think of as public art?  How should 
enforcing against tagging be balanced against other crimes? 
Distributive justice recognizes the inherently political nature of such 
judgments.
291
  It is appropriate to leave such difficult, value-laden questions 
to the political process, so long as that process operates within specified 
constraints.  Distributive justice imposes limitations upon the democratic 
process such that it cannot be used to advance majoritarian (or parochial) 
interests that undermine fundamental liberal principles, including 
egalitarianism.
292
  The state may not distribute benefits or burdens on the 
basis of morally irrelevant social attributes, even if supported by a 
democratic majority.
293
  Thus there must be constraints on the democratic 
 
287 See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 122–25 (discussing the connection between 
racial targeting decreasing crime and the dependency on the relative elasticity of different 
groups to policing); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do 
People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 233–
36 (2008) (discussing how overenforcing criminal laws may erode community support for 
the police, which, in turn, leads to increased crime). 
288 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox 
of Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES 3, 20–21 (Tracey L. Meares & Dan M Kahan eds., 
1999) (criticizing civil libertarians for focusing on minority crime suspects’ rights at the 
expense of minority crime victims’ rights); Meares, supra note 35, at 696–702 (arguing that 
police overenforce narcotics and minor crimes in minority communities, but generally 
underenforce serious crimes); Natapoff, supra note 35, at 1772 (arguing the same). 
289 Cf. Brown, supra note 283, at 352–57. 
290 Cf. Kahan, supra note 276, at 427–28. 
291 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 3–4 (1993). 
292 See id. at xxiii–l, 41. 
293 See RAWLS, supra note 271, at 129. 
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process that forbid infringement on fundamental rights and equality.
294
  As 
discussed in the next subsection, this notion resonates with a democratic-
representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review.  Before considering the 
courts’ role in regulating police department discretion, however, one must 
understand what an equal distribution of arrests should entail. 
Distributive justice does not require absolute equality.  John Rawls’s 
two principles of justice, for example, permit inequality within roughly 
defined limits.
295
  The first principle requires the “most extensive scheme of 
equal basic liberties” that are consistent with organized coexistence.
296
  The 
second principle requires that any social and economic inequality be 
organized such that it inures to everyone’s benefit.
297
  The first principle 
permits deprivations of liberty for those who have grievously impinged 
upon others’ basic liberties, so that equal liberties are permitted only as far 
as is consistent with everyone having those liberties.
298
  Punishing violent 
crimes or crimes against property, for example, would be consistent with 
the first principle.
299
  The second principle permits inequality to the extent 
that those who are uniquely productive or talented may take a larger share 
of the economic pie if their activities expand the pie for all, particularly the 
disadvantaged.
300
  Distributive justice will be served when democratic 
institutions solve problems within the bounds suggested by the two 
principles of justice.  That process will generate winners and losers, but 
distributive justice limits the bases upon which distinctions may be made 
and the scope of any resulting inequalities. 
Distributive justice suggests two basic points about when the political 
process will yield outcomes consistent with Rawls’s two principles of 
justice: when participants are well-informed and imagine themselves as 
both the potential beneficiaries and cost-bearers of their political choices.
301
  
Put differently, popular politics will yield egalitarian outcomes when 
 
294 See RAWLS, supra note 291, at 41. 
295 These two principles anchor Rawls’s entire conception of liberal justice.  RAWLS, 
supra note 271, at 10–14. 
296 Id. at 53. 
297 Id. 
298 Id.  Equal liberty for all, by definition, cannot include the freedom to restrict others’ 
liberty. 
299 While Rawls himself is not explicit about this, Professor Dolovich has persuasively 
demonstrated that, with slight modifications, Rawls’s model generates principles of 
punishment.  Dolovich, supra note 280, at 328 (noting modification for partial compliance). 
300 RAWLS, supra note 271, at 65–66. 
301 Id. at 314–15 (describing an idealized legislative process).  The principles of justice 
are themselves generated by an idealized democratic deliberation.  Id. at 15 (describing the 
“original position”). 
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citizens are well-informed and “other regarding.”
302
  To imagine oneself as 
a potential beneficiary or cost-bearer requires citizens to have the capacity 
for imagining themselves in the shoes of their co-citizens, particularly those 
who are less advantaged.
303
  This, of course, is a highly idealized vision of 
citizenship and political community—these ideals are intended to serve 
both as a model for our political institutions and for identifying the specific 
constraints that should be imposed upon such political institutions and 
processes.
304
  Of course our is is a far cry from Rawls’s ought.  That is 
doubly true for the politics of criminal justice. 
The actual politics of crime in the United States scarcely resembles 
these liberal ideals.
305
  Professor Stuntz has described America’s politics of 
crime as “pathological.”
306
  Jonathan Simon has convincingly argued that 
middle-class voters imagine their political agency in a language of 
“victimhood” that presupposes a racialized divide between criminals and 
victims.
307
  Political discourse around crime has expressly cast “criminals” 
as poor minorities—Michelle Alexander has recently described how that 
has been an express tactic of political campaigns since the 1960s.
308
  And it 
has been a successful tactic—at least, if one imagines “success” in terms of 
winning office.
309
  This politics plays a substantial role in producing the 
glaring disparities in arrest rates for non-violent crime.
310
  Michael Tonry 
has suggested that the political expendability and rhetorical criminalization 
of poor, urban minorities made them the most obvious “enemy” in the war 
 
302 See ACKERMAN, supra note 271, at 6–7, 11, 72–73 (explaining that idealized 
liberalism is one in which individuals work out distributive questions through dialogue 
without recourse to claims of superiority); RAWLS, supra note 271, at 118–19 (“They must 
choose principles the consequences of which they are prepared to live with whatever 
generation they turn out to belong to.”).  In his later work, Rawls described the relation that 
prevails between members of the political community as “civic friendship.”  RAWLS, supra 
note 291, at xlix. 
303 See RAWLS, supra note 271, at 453; see also JURGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF 
THE OTHER 96 (1998) (noting that Rawls’s “original position” actually describes a state of 
intersubjective connection between all members of the political community); Dolovich, 
supra note 280, at 332–34 (describing the “veil of ignorance”). 
304 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 291, at 25–26 (noting that the original position is an 
analytical device and should not be confused with the actual political world). 
305 See Dolovich, supra note 280, at 430–40. 
306 See Stuntz, supra note 142, at 505; see also Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2003 (arguing 
that the suburbanization-generated white voting block undermines egalitarianism). 
307 SIMON, supra note 79, at 76. 
308 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 43–45 (2010) (describing the Republican 
Party’s use of criminal justice as a racial “wedge” issue in the 1960s). 
309 Id. at 44–47. 
310 Id. at 44–56. 
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on drugs.
311
  This has all played out in a broader context marked by 
increased hostility to welfarism.  Middle-class voters’ hostility to welfare 
has choked public services for the poor and impelled the withdrawal of such 
state agencies from the poorest neighborhoods.  Loic Waquant has 
convincingly shown that American cities have left it almost exclusively to 
police to “manage” the poor.
312
 
Some criminal justice scholars have posited that local communities 
approximate the liberal ideal because of the associations between victims, 
offenders, and other residents.
313
  Many have criticized this view of 
localism.
314
  First, it assumes that police departments are politically 
accountable, which is not necessarily true.
315
  Second, “process failure” is 
not unique to large political communities—majorities and minorities can 
form in small communities, and the former can be very parochial.
316
  And 
third, police authority is not delimited in sub-local terms, but rather in terms 
of the larger political unit; i.e., police departments are city or county 
agencies.  Contests over departmental discretion will often implicate the 
interests of multiple sub-local communities.
317
  For example, intensive 
concentration of police resources in one neighborhood may come at the 
expense of deploying resources in another or even result in crime being 
displaced to another neighborhood.  There is little reason to think that 
voters in American cities will behave in a manner that is consistent with 
 
311 TONRY, supra note 5, at 112–13. 
312 LOIC WAQUANT, URBAN OUTCASTS 12, 30–34 (2008). 
313 See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis Of Criminal 
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1161, 1182 (1998); see also Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2031–32 
(arguing for more local control over criminal justice system).  But see Richard C. Schragger, 
The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 385–86 (2001) (arguing that the social norms 
scholars do not adequately address how to define a “community”); Robert Weisberg, Norms 
and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 467, 508–14 (2003) (criticizing the “social norms” approach to policing the 
“inner city”). 
314 See, e.g., Alafair Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former 
Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1005, 1010 (2003); David Cole, 
Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal 
Justice Scholarhip, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1086 (1999) (“[O]nce one looks beyond romanticized 
invocations of ‘the community,’ it becomes apparent that no community is united on these 
issues.”); Schragger, supra note 313, at 416–58; Weisberg, supra note 313, at 508–14. 
315 See WILSON, supra note 12, at 230–33; supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
316 See VENKATESH, supra note 93, at 72 (noting that community policing meetings 
favored those with “social clout” in the neighborhood); Schragger, supra note 313, at 445 
(“[T]he disenfranchised and marginal are almost never considered members of any 
community.”). 
317 See Schragger, supra note 313, at 470–71 (“[W]hat is called ‘local’ is always 
‘interlocal.’”). 
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liberal principles of equality,
318
 although a few might.
319
 
All of this is to say that popular politics are not likely to act as a 
meaningful constraint on police departments.  It should be up to legal 
institutions to make up for that.   
B. “POLITICAL FAILURE” AND DEPARTMENTAL DISCRETION 
Distributive justice principles suggest that law ought to guarantee an 
egalitarian distribution of proactive policing’s costs and benefits when 
majoritarian politics cannot.  Building on the discussion above, this 
Subsection shows that courts should ensure that members of the relevant 
political community (1) bear a fair share of proactive policing’s costs, 
including those associated with arrest, and (2) have full information as to 
crime’s occurrence and the demographic profile generated by proactive 
policing arrests. 
Rawls himself suggested that it may be up to the “judicial virtues [of] 
impartiality and considerateness” to effect liberal justice in the real 
world.
320
  His ambition was to formulate an “objective” measure of liberal 
justice that could be held up to our own political institutions.
321
  Where they 
fail to live up to those standards, we might reasonably expect that the 
judicial virtues would save us.  This hope resonates with other liberal 
conceptions of judicial review,
322
 including John Ely’s.
323
  In his famous 
formulation, Ely argues that constitutional courts ought to constrain 
political majorities’ ability to systematically impose costs upon a disfavored 
minority.
324
  Because minorities cannot use the political process to 
challenge such an imposition, Ely argues that constitutional courts should 
disallow it.  This is tantamount to empowering courts to compel the 
outcome that would have resulted had the majority behaved in a manner 
consistent with idealized democratic fairness—i.e., a manner in which 
 
318 See Stuntz, supra note 33, at 2003. 
319 A number of jurisdictions have passed laws directing law enforcement to de-prioritize 
enforcement against marijuana possession.  See Phillip Smith, Lowest Law Enforcement 
Priority Marijuana Initiatives Face the Voters in Five Cities, DRUG WAR CHRON. (Oct. 26, 
2006, 5:51 PM), http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/459/marijuana_lowest_enforcement_
priority_initiatives. 
320 RAWLS, supra note 271, at 453. 
321 Id. 
322 ACKERMAN, supra note 271, at 311. 
323 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 136 (1980) (establishing that a 
distributive scheme that is just requires judicial analysis of the process that produced it).  But 
see Kahan & Meares, supra note 313, at 1161, 1172 (arguing that police departments are 
accountable to minorities as evidenced by the number of black political leaders and police 
officers). 
324 ELY, supra note 323, at 151. 
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individual citizens, given full information, impose only those costs that they 
themselves would be willing to bear.
325
 
The obligation to distribute policing costs equitably ought to require 
police departments to make arrests in proportion to the rate of specific 
criminal misconduct in specific areas.  Police departments should not arrest 
offenders in one community while allowing those in another community to 
engage in similar conduct with impunity.
326
  That is to say, law should 
regulate police departments’ geographic deployment, enforcement priority, 
and tactical policies in order to minimize disparate impact on minority 
offenders.  For example, where drug crimes regularly occur in both wealthy 
and poor sections of a city, law enforcement should be required to make 
arrests in both parts of town.  The same would hold true for all minor 
crimes that are the subject of proactive policing.  If arrest-intensive units are 
to be deployed against low-income minorities for narcotics possession 
offenses,
327
 then so should they be against middle-class offenders who 
engage in comparable conduct.  Not only will this outcome, in and of itself, 
be consistent with egalitarianism, it will also enhance popular democracy’s 
capacity for producing egalitarian results.  If the costs of proactive policing 
are evenly distributed, one would expect the political process to be a greater 
source of equality-enhancing pressure upon police departments—i.e., if 
politically empowered citizens dislike the effects of proactive policing in 
their communities, they are likely to bring their political power to bear on 
police departments and, perhaps more importantly, on legislatures to 
criminalize in a more restrained and circumspect way.
328
 
An egalitarian mandate also counsels against making geographic 
deployment and enforcement priority choices based on highly subjective, 
impressionistic criteria such as the “disorderliness” of a neighborhood.  As 
discussed above, social science research suggests that race and class 
stereotypes tend to animate such judgments.  Because of its emphasis on 
disorderliness, policymaking regarding quality-of-life policing is 
particularly vulnerable to bias.
329
  An egalitarian mandate would require 
police departments to make proactive policing arrests in proportion to the 
actual rates of offense-specific misconduct in particular places.  Requiring 
 
325 See id. at 170 (arguing there is no danger of constitutional infirmity where a majority 
has elected to impose a cost upon itself). 
326 Cf. Stuntz, supra note 160, at 826 (suggesting that law ought to pay attention to 
criminal law outcomes, not just processes). 
327 See Dwyer, supra note 150. 
328 Cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004) (noting police practice that has broad 
impact is the type that can be challenged through the political process). 
329 See Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 167, at 323 (arguing that perceptions of 
“social disorder” are more a function of race and class assumptions than of actual disorder). 
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police departments to distribute proactive policing arrests in this manner 
generates operational questions for which I can only give schematic 
answers at this point. 
Courts and prosecutors should guarantee the equitable distribution of 
proactive policing arrests.  Because they have substantial charging 
discretion, prosecutors exert indirect control over police departments’ arrest 
choices.
330
  If prosecutors refused to charge cases that contribute to an 
unjustifiably non-white conviction rate, for example, that might induce 
police departments to calibrate their enforcement choices to produce a 
balanced arrestee demographic.  Prosecutorial regulation, however, is an 
imperfect solution to the police discretion problem.  Whether prosecutors 
are able to use charging decisions to regulate police discretion will turn on 
the relationships between the police department, prosecutor’s office, and the 
electorate.  Because they are typically elected, prosecutors are likely more 
influenced by popular politics (and, thus, vulnerable to political failure) 
than police departments.  It may be politically unpalatable for a prosecutor 
to refuse prosecuting substantial numbers of arrests.  Therefore, it is 
unlikely that many prosecutors would, sua sponte, regulate departmental 
discretion in the manner distributive justice suggests.
331
 
Courts should play the central role in preventing police discretion from 
undermining egalitarianism.  Although criminal courts are equipped to 
interrogate exercises of individual officer discretion, interrogating exercises 
of institutional discretion will entail a host of evidentiary and other practical 
challenges.  Judging whether a police department distributes arrests equally 
will require delving into police departments’ decisionmaking processes.  As 
with any challenge of institutional practice, such litigation could be time-
consuming and complex.  Criminal defendants would often have an 
incentive to litigate such claims in cases generated by proactive policing.  It 
may be that permitting such in the context of ordinary criminal prosecutions 
would impose a substantial burden on criminal courts; however, this would 
be most true early on.  Over time, one would expect that police departments 
would begin distributing proactive policing arrests equally or develop the 
capacity for demonstrating how differential arrest rates were tied to 
differential offense rates. 
Another, less compelling, alternative might be to vest the authority to 
bring such suits in a federal agency.  The Department of Justice currently 
has the power to bring challenges against police departments that engage in 
 
330 See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 778 (2003) (describing the relationship between federal 
prosecutors and enforcement agents). 
331 See Stuntz, supra note 160, at 836 (suggesting that prosecutors be made to 
demonstrate equality in charging decisions). 
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systematic and egregious misconduct.
332
  An analogous mechanism to 
regulate arrest disparity might allow for challenging those police 
departments that have the worst records for arrest disparity.
333
  The federal 
government is much better equipped than individual defense attorneys or 
defender agencies to gather the data and develop the metrics that will be 
necessary to evaluate departmental discretion.  However, given the 
Department of Justice’s limited use of § 14141 to date, it is hard to imagine 
the Department using it aggressively to check arrest disparity, even if 
empowered to do so. 
Critics will charge that courts are ill-equipped to balance competing 
crime-control priorities and therefore should not second-guess police 
department policymaking.  Judicial review of arrest distribution, however, 
need not amount to wholesale second-guessing of police department 
policymaking.  Equal enforcement is potentially consistent with a wide 
array of enforcement (and non-enforcement) decisions.  Police departments 
should be free to constructively use their expertise to make those decisions 
in the manner that best responds to local conditions, provided that the 
decisionmaking protocol reflects equality concerns.  Courts should ensure 
the legal adequacy of any given protocol and that any given police 
department is actually adhering to it.  There is a rough precedent for such in 
the Court’s checkpoint cases under the Fourth Amendment.  Police are free 
to carry out stops without individualized suspicion at a fixed checkpoint, 
provided that it is deployed for a permissible purpose and there is a protocol 
regulating officer conduct at the checkpoint so as to minimize its 
intrusiveness for motorists.
334
  The Court has not specifically enumerated 
what kinds of purposes are acceptable or, specifically, how officer 
discretion is to be circumscribed.
335
  Police departments retain discretion to 
craft such policy as required by circumstances, provided that it is exercised 
within the general parameters specified by the Court.
336
  An equality 
 
332 See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006); see also Stuntz, supra note 160, at 828–30 (arguing 
that § 14141 creates an important tool for regulating police departments). 
333 See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that DOJ ought to enforce § 14141 against the worst 
offenders first). 
334 See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000); Mich. Dept. State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990) (holding a DUI checkpoint permissible in part because stops 
were conducted pursuant to department-issued guidelines). 
335 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (leaving it to police departments to use checkpoints for 
an unspecified range of purposes provided that they are not used for “ordinary crime 
control”); see also Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(upholding preliminary injunction of a police checkpoint that restricted entry to a 
Washington, D.C., neighborhood in which numerous assaults and homicides had occurred). 
336 But see Jason Fiebig, Comment, Police Checkpoints: Lack of Guidance from the 
Supreme Court Contributes to Disregard of Civil Liberties in the District of Columbia, 100 
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mandate would function similarly.  Courts would not require that police 
enforce any specific law in any specific way, but only that whatever 
proactive policing they elect to do generally comply with an egalitarian 
arrest mandate. 
There are significant informational challenges for regulating arrest 
disparity.  In particular, effective regulation will require developing the 
capacity for generating three kinds of data: (1) offense rates for particular 
crimes in particular places, (2) the demographic profile of arrestees by 




The first category of information presents a challenge in that 
individuals engaged in criminal activity do not typically offer themselves 
up for counting.  That said, with proper investment, it is possible to develop 
techniques for estimating offense rates for particular crimes amongst 
different groups in a city.
338
  More than just that, however, it will be 
important to develop metrics for comparing crime-control exigencies across 
criminal-law categories.  There will be rare instances where police 
departments enforce against particular crimes while permitting precisely 
identical conduct in another part of the city.  Police departments must often 
distinguish between offenses that are comparable, but not identical, e.g., 
crack sales in a park versus ecstasy sales in a club.  More difficult yet will 
be comparisons between different offenses.
339
  It may very well be that 
comparisons between finely distinguished offense definitions is not 
possible, leaving arrest distribution to be measured in terms of broader 
categories.  Such an approach would recognize that specific manifestations 
of misconduct might be quite different in one part of a city than from 
another.  However, the categories should not be as broad and 
impressionistic as “disorderliness.”
340
  Nor should defining these categories 
be left entirely to the intuitive judgments of police department 
policymakers.  As discussed above, these judgments should be subject to 
judicial review. 
Departmental discretion receives little attention, in part, because there 
is little empirical information as to its dimensions and consequences.  
 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 599, 600, 628 (2010) (criticizing the vagueness of Supreme 
Court cases and arguing that it should review police checkpoints with strict scrutiny). 
337 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 160, at 834–35 (noting the importance of information 
collection in the regulation of police). 
338 See, e.g., Beckett et al., supra note 168, at 426 (estimating demographic profiles of 
those engaged in drug selling). 
339 But see WILSON, supra note 12, at 36 (contending that there is no such thing as like 
cases in policing). 
340 See supra notes 253–258 and accompanying text. 
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Pointing to a high minority-arrest rate to substantiate a high offense rate is 
circular.
341
  The vast majority of America’s police departments do not 
systematically assemble data for arrests by race, offense, arresting unit, 
geography, contraband seized, number of individuals arrested in the course 
of an operation, and number of officer hours required for the operation.
342
  
Such data would not only help illuminate the relationship between 
departmental discretion and the demographic profile of arrestees, but also 
cast light on proactive policing’s efficiency.  Without such information, it is 
impossible to address the discretion problem as a matter of equality or 
efficiency. 
Courts can help with the information gap.  Among the great triumphs 
of the racial profiling litigation in the 1990s and early 2000s has been the 
number of record-keeping agreements that the settlements have 
engendered.
343
  The information has, in turn, spawned considerable research 
demonstrating the expense and futility of profiling in the traffic context.
344
  
As discussed above, DWB is not the best analogy for the problem of 
institutional discretion.  It is, however, a study in the cascading political and 
social effects of increased information flow.  DWB litigation generated 
settlement agreements that bound police departments to collect and 
disseminate demographic information for traffic stops.  That information 
has, in turn, helped generate greater public scrutiny of police practices.
345
  It 
is only through litigation, whether over Freedom of Information Act 
requests or substantive challenges to policy or practice,
346
 that academics 
and advocates will secure access to the kinds of data that might prompt 
greater transparency and information sharing.  Increased information 
sharing by itself is unlikely to guarantee police departments’ democratic 
accountability, but it would be a good start. 
If generating the kind of information described above is impracticable 
or unduly expensive, it may be that randomization offers a second-best 
approach to achieving equitable arrest distribution.  Bernard Harcourt has 
persuasively advanced randomization as an antidote to racial profiling and, 
more generally, to the harmful distributive consequences of actuarial, 
 
341 See supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text. 
342 Even when they do, police departments are not eager to divulge such data.  See, e.g., 
State v. Johnson, No. 52123-3-I, 2005 WL 353314, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2005). 
343 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
344 See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 118–22 (describing various economic model studies 
of racial profiling). 
345 See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 150; Sam Skolnik, Drug Arrests Target Blacks Most 
Often, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 2001, at B1. 
346 See Johnson, 2005 WL 353314 at *1.  Cf. Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Memos Spell 
Out Brutal C.I.A. Mode of Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 2009, at A1 (describing the 
role of ACLU litigation in compelling disclosure of information). 
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predictive technique in criminal justice.
347
  Randomization entails using a 
randomized procedure for selecting targets of criminal enforcement, and 
Harcourt’s examples include random numerical ordering of highway 
vehicle stops or random selection of Social Security numbers for tax 
audits.
348
  Randomization is primarily directed at ameliorating prediction’s 
harmful consequences, such as disproportionate stops of minority 
motorists.
349
  It is not explicitly concerned with policing’s benefits.  
Notwithstanding, randomization could be a step in the direction of 
managing proactive policing’s negative distributive consequences. 
The proposal here, of course, breaks dramatically with existing 
constitutional criminal procedure and equal protection jurisprudence.
350
  
The Supreme Court has rejected disparate impact as a basis for equal 
protection claims in most instances,
351
 and more generally, it has rejected 
Ely’s vision of the Fourteenth Amendment as a device for correcting 
political process failure.
352
  The Court is also unsympathetic to civil rights 
claims in which the guilty challenge their convictions.
353
  In that vein, the 
Court is particularly reluctant to entertain selective enforcement claims that 
question law enforcement discretion.
354
  The Court’s jurisprudence is 
symptomatic of guilt’s exaggerated moral import in legal and political 
discussion.  That jurisprudence pays no heed to departmental discretion’s 
severe distributive consequences. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to reconceptualize policing in two ways.  First, 
courts and scholars ought to consider police departments as discretion-
wielding agents separate and apart from individual officers.  Departmental 
discretion determines how arrests are distributed across a jurisdiction.  
Geographic deployment, enforcement priority, and enforcement tactics are 
the key dimensions of departmental discretion in the proactive policing 
 
347 See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 238–39 (noting that any person committing a given 
crime should have the same probability of getting caught). 
348 Id. at 238. 
349 See id. 
350 See supra Part II.B. 
351 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
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353 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (refusing to permit 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claims that “necessarily imply the invalidity of [a] conviction”). 
354 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
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context.  Conceptualizing policing in terms of these choices brings the 
relationship between departmental discretion and egalitarianism into stark 
relief.  That proactive policing generates a dramatically high minority-arrest 
rate suggests that police departments are not making these choices with 
sensitivity to equality.  Neither courts nor legislatures give departments 
direction on how to distribute proactive policing arrests.  That should 
change. 
Second, distributive justice principles ought to guide the regulation of 
departmental discretion in the proactive policing context.  Distributive 
justice suggests that police departments should distribute the benefits and 
burdens associated with proactive policing in a manner that promotes 
egalitarianism.  John Ely’s theory of judicial review and courts’ already 
central role in regulating criminal justice counsel in favor of courts 
guaranteeing the egalitarian distribution of police departments’ punitive 
power. 
Over the last forty years, the United States has relied upon criminal 
law enforcement as opposed to social welfare policies to address the 
complicated problems that beset America’s poorest urban communities.
355
  
That political and legal fact makes it all the more pressing that police 
departments advance crime control in a manner that is equality-enhancing.  
Distributive justice also lays the groundwork for questioning whether police 





355 See WAQUANT, supra note 312, at 12, 30–34. 
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